Meaning in Wittgenstein and African Indigenous Languages
Philip Chika Omenukwa, Ikechukwu Anthony Kanu
This paper focuses on the issue of meaning in Wittgenstein’s philosophy as it is noticeable in both the early and later Wittgensteins. In the early Wittgenstein expressed in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, the researchers observed a position influenced by the logically positivist ideology, whereby propositions are meaningful only if they picture states of affairs and with this the insistence on a logically perfect language was made. The implication being that some languages are considered nonsense and unfit for philosophical engagement. However, in his Philosophical Investigations, which is regarded as the later Wittgenstein, a new approach to discovering the constitutive embodiment of meaning became noticeable. Here, Wittgenstein observes that the meaning of a term, phrase or sentence drives from the context of use and thus recognizes the legitimacy of different forms of life. Thus, the “use” of a language is a game played according to rules that can be understood by the language community or individual users of the language. For the purpose of achieving the aim and objectives of this paper, the hermeneutic, analytical and critical methods of inquiry were employed. The paper argues that since meaning must be sought within the context of use in accordance with the rules that can be understood by the language community or individual users of the language, it is a win for African languages as they are scientifically equipped with their appurtenances for valid philosophical engagement.
Keywords: Meaning, Wittgenstein, Language, Language game, Forms of life
