Private Language in Wittgenstein and the Igbo-African Worldview
Philip Chika Omenukwa, Ikechukwu Anthony Kanu
Private Language has been described as the language in which words refer to sensation. Some philosophers have defended the notion of private language simply because there are private sensations. One of Wittgenstein’s great philosophical achievements is that he at least insisted that the meaning of human language is its use, that is to say: communication! And that this communication is a rather public affair, a cultural presupposition, and the bedrock of human interaction. Communication and Social interaction define the world of an Igbo-African. And so, his world can only be gravely affected and thrown into crisis with the adoption of a private language as a viable, sustainable and legitimate means of communicative tool. This paper distinguishes itself given that it draws from available textual evidence and observation and in line with the postulations of Ludwig Wittgenstein addresses these issues. It will do this by insisting that language is a human social instrument. And being social and public it involves rule-following, and to depart from this rule-following is to inaugurate crisis within the socio-cosmic world of an Igbo-African in particular and of every human being in general. For the purpose of this paper, the hermeneutic, analytical and critical methods of inquiry will be employed. The paper submits that if, ordinarily, the human interpersonal relationship is governed by following or breaking a rule, this can make sense only if there is a social interaction or better still, an active human interaction, and in this sense there can be no such thing as solitary rule-following. There cannot be a private language.
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Language, Igbo, African, Social interaction, Communication, Social interaction
