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Sociological Writing: Characteristics and Determinants

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
	This study seeks to identify the key characteristics of sociological writing, particularly when addressing fields dominated by specific hegemonies. It emphasizes the importance of cognitive vigilance to prevent the infiltration of spontaneous phenomena, along with its associated concepts and vocabulary, into sociological discourse. The study focuses on the rupture between sociological writing, on one hand, and what is referred to as "spontaneous sociology," on the other, particularly during the construction of topics, formulation of concepts, and creation of language characterized by precision and rigor.To address this issue, the research is organized around three main dimensions. First, it investigates the broad meaning of the concept of "spontaneous sense," examining how axiomatic assumptions often disguise themselves as truths. Second, it explores the process of constructing sociological analysis, including the formulation of problems, creation of concepts, and networking of relationships—not between tangible objects, but between issues and concepts. Finally, the study highlights the distinctive characteristics of sociological writing, which is tasked with approaching reality in a way that resists the infiltration of dominant concepts into its core framework. This distinguishes sociological writing from other forms, such as literary or journalistic writing. The study employs a critical analytical approach, relying on live examples to identify and analyze issues. The findings of this paper articulate the following ideas: Debate with Spontaneous Language: Scientific progress in the humanities requires endless debate and critical engagement with spontaneous language and the narratives it generates. These narratives often represent the perspectives of opposing social forces in the arena of conflict. It is thus essential to critically assess and confine ready-made concepts and templates. The Process of Construction: There is no scientific inquiry without a process of construction, which involves developing problems and formulating concepts. This approach begins not with empirical reality but with the "sociological imagination," as articulated by C. Wright Mills. This enables researchers to critique given subjects and reconstruct them scientifically, reflecting the primary function of sociology: to reconstruct reality using its unique language and concepts while simultaneously striving to understand and interpret it. Working with Ordinary Language: Sociologists must rework ordinary language to create spaces for scientific expression. While technical training in areas such as digitization or measurement tools is valuable, it is insufficient without proficiency in drafting and writing. Without this skill and a clear intellectual affiliation with a sociological school or tradition, the production of knowledge and the cultivation of thinkers become paralyzed. This is a prevalent issue in most, if not all, Arab universities, where the focus often remains on producing technicians or, at best, experts, rather than true scientific contributors. sThe study highlights the importance of employing knowledge from various fields across all aspects of social life. It stresses the need for a deeper focus on the questions raised by this paper and proposes the development of a knowledge framework to
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guide researchers and students in sociology. Such a framework would train them to draft, write, and construct sociological analyses using rigorous scientific methods.

INTRODUCTION

Without resorting to a literal or mechanistic comparison between the natural sciences and the humanities, it is evident that natural sciences such as chemistry and physics have succeeded in creating their own distinct languages, akin to mathematics and statistics. In contrast, the humanities—and sociology and anthropology in particular—continue to borrow heavily from ordinary language and the language of common sense, which is used and understood by the general public. This reliance raises a critical question:

How can science communicate in the language of the common people without succumbing to the inherent pitfalls of that language? These pitfalls include normative judgments, embedded biases, generalizations, inaccuracies, and a lack of precision in meaning. In other words, how can scientific discourse utilize common language while maintaining its demand for accuracy and the nuanced differentiation of meanings? Furthermore, how can scholars work from within the confines of ordinary language to refine and correct it—or, at the very least, distance themselves from it and strive to invent or create a new language within it that expresses what the dominant and prevailing language cannot?

This challenge aligns with Wittgenstein's investigations into philosophical discourse and the dangers posed by ordinary language in constructing thought (Glock, 2016). It is a dilemma that has been explored not only by Wittgenstein but also by Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, and Jean Chamboredon in *The Craft of Sociology* (Bourdieu, 1991), as well as by C. Wright Mills in *The Sociological Imagination* (Mills, 2000).

How, then, can we overcome this challenge? Should we, as Nietzsche suggests, take a hammer to the structure of language to dismantle expressions or ambiguous terms that obscure the truth? How can we engage with ordinary language—not merely adopting it with all its flaws and limitations—but rather working from within it to create fissures and openings through which we can articulate scientific knowledge? This requires a process wherein we are not merely spoken by the language but actively shape it to serve the demands of scientific inquiry.

Practically speaking, how can we enter the domain of language and refine its words and meanings to align with the precision, clarity, and rigor required for sociological writing? Scientific expression demands the ability to articulate minute details (nuances) that unveil hidden meanings and achieve the ultimate purpose of knowledge: understanding and interpreting phenomena and the questions they pose, using language rooted in the epistemological field.

How can we guard against the intrusion of spontaneity, or common sense? How can we manipulate words to extract from them what they are reluctant to reveal, forcing them to disclose hidden issues, concepts, and relationships? These questions form the central problem this research seeks to address. This problem is not limited to methodology and theory but extends to the very nature of sociological and anthropological writing—its formulation and the construction of its subject matter.

The core question can thus be distilled: As the social field is a product of social actors, shaped by dominant and diverse social discourses, and as the public sphere operates with its own language, senses, concepts, and discourse, how can sociological discourse interpret and understand reality and phenomena without becoming ensnared by the vocabulary and constructs of that language? How can sociology craft its own language to study and represent the fields it investigates?

It is important to highlight from the outset that this issue has persisted since the establishment of the humanities in the late nineteenth century, with early founders extensively addressing and deliberating on it. For example, Karl Marx, in his *Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1969), critiques the process of normalization, wherein cultural phenomena are redefined as

natural, creating the illusion that they are inherent and immutable. This normalization serves a singular purpose: the production of non-knowledge—essentially, the creation of error or illusion—and the legitimization of falsehood. In simpler terms, it facilitates the construction of ideological discourse.

Similarly, Émile Durkheim, in his seminal work *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Durkheim, 1982), critiques the reliance on ready-made concepts. These concepts, he argues, act as traps or nets into which researchers may inadvertently fall, leaving them confined within these conceptual frameworks. Durkheim advocates treating social phenomena as "things," much like natural scientists treat physical objects. This approach shifts the focus to studying relationships rather than entities in isolation.

Max Weber, for his part, underscores the importance of objectivity. In his methodology, he emphasizes examining phenomena from an external perspective, maintaining the necessary analytical distance to observe all active forces within the arena of conflict. This approach enables researchers to uncover what Weber refers to as "totality," free from biases toward any particular social group. Weber encapsulates this principle in the concept of "axiological neutrality" (Weber, 2021; Raza, 2023).

As evident, this issue has persisted and remains unresolved—a dilemma that defies definitive solutions. The battle against error and non-knowledge, or the production of falsehoods, is an ongoing struggle. Gaston Bachelard emphasizes that error, rather than truth, is the natural state of knowledge (Bachelard, 2021). Errors are continually renewed, and non-knowledge—fabricated falsehoods—is systematically produced by dominant forces in social struggles to protect and perpetuate their interests. The production of lies, deception, and fallacies is integral to this process, necessitating constant vigilance and critical awareness on the part of researchers to confront these epistemic dangers effectively.

Discussing this issue is essential as a reminder to ourselves and as a guide for emerging learners, researchers, and students in the humanities. It emphasizes the persistent overlap between the production of knowledge and the production of falsehood, or between the reproduction of "doxa" and the creation of truth. These processes are inherently intertwined. As Michel Foucault explains in *The Order of Discourse* (Foucault, 1970), the production of truth itself emerges from an authority that has triumphed over another, thereby suppressing its version of truth.

While addressing this complex issue, we are often struck by the neglect it receives from some professors of methodology in universities and research centers across the Arab world. These educators either completely disregard such crucial issues or touch upon them only superficially. Instead, their focus is disproportionately placed on technical aspects of research, such as sampling techniques or measurement tools, which they present as priorities in sociological research. This approach perpetuates the misconception among students and emerging researchers that methodology is primarily about technicalities—choosing samples or employing specific measurement tools—rather than constructing new problems, formulating innovative concepts, or developing a scientific language capable of confronting the spontaneity embedded within ordinary language.

This "bureaucratic" and overly technical approach, which often lacks responsibility and vision, continues to represent the core of the methodological crisis in the humanities, particularly in contemporary Arab academic institutions.

The issue of sociological writing is the central focus of this paper: How does sociology construct its discourse on reality, and what vocabulary does it employ? More specifically, how can sociology move beyond the "given" and construct a scientific subject relationally, based on the premise that science is inherently relational? How can it delineate the boundaries between the spontaneous and the scientific, and between truth and the illusion that masquerades as truth?

This problem will be addressed through three main perspectives:

The "Given" topic: We will examine the given topic and delve into its hidden layers, where axioms and "doxa" reside. These axioms, described by Roland Barthes as "astonishing," should themselves become subjects of study, analysis, and scrutiny. They should not be allowed to disguise themselves in various forms and occupy an unchallenged place within the framework of sociological discourse. How do the conflicting forces within the arena of social conflict create and perpetuate these axioms?

The scientific topic: We will explore the process of constructing the scientific subject. This includes the articulation of concepts and the invention of new relationships, aimed at complicating reality as a step toward its deconstruction and the discovery of its deeper dimensions.

A new language for the humanities: Finally, we will investigate the possibility of creating a new language for the humanities. This will involve examining the distinctive characteristics of sociological writing compared to other forms of writing, such as literary or journalistic styles. The goal is to identify the foundational pillars that underpin the unique language and methods of sociological writing.

1. Spontaneous sociology and ordinary language

One of the important issues that continues to perplex beginners in the humanities, particularly in sociology and anthropology, is the issue of method. What do we mean by methodology, or rather, *methodology* (Methodology)? What is the difference between culture and method?

Let us propose that culture—and here we specifically mean sociological culture—is what remains in memory when we forget everything else. It is what lingers when we close our books, finish our lessons, and return the "sociological service tools," as Becker (1998) describes them, to their bags, stepping away from research centers and universities. These are the "mechanisms" that become almost automatic, deeply rooted, and unerasable from the sociologist's or anthropologist's memory, mind, and imagination. They represent the reflexive processes a researcher performs almost involuntarily in response to a social phenomenon. Such processes include distancing oneself, confronting preconceived judgments, rationalizing facts, and reframing the biographical, natural, or metaphysical as historical and cultural. These "mechanisms" have become second nature to experienced researchers in the humanities.

As for the method, it is like a castle or a building—a structure we design and place before us with the aim of achieving a specific goal, such as verifying or testing an experience, hypothesis, or theoretical idea we wish to examine (Bourdieu, 1993). While culture nourishes the method and facilitates its realization as a viable project, the method, in turn, strives to stabilize, expand, deepen, and enrich culture with every application, enhancing its understanding and interpretation.

The central idea we aim to address in this chapter is to expose the spontaneous, bring it to light, and extract it from the hidden places where it resides—in the folds, gaps, and turns of language. What, then, is spontaneity? Are there other terms that translate and convey its meaning? How does it often slip between words and phrases, embedding itself within them? And what can be done to contain this form of non-knowledge—or spontaneous knowledge—as an essential first step in the construction of scientific understanding, even if this requires generating a new language within the confines of dominant, ordinary language?

A. Spontaneous identification

Spontaneity is almost what philosophers refer to as *doxa*, meaning things that are self-evident and rooted in common sense. Expressions, packaged in ready-made templates such as popular proverbs, are sometimes surrounded by an aura of sanctity, making them beyond question, critique, or debate (Bourdieu, 1993). We can also define spontaneity as what is called error, ignorance, falsehood, advertising, propaganda, or mythology—productions or reproductions of illusion. This is not just a remnant of ancient cultures or a past mode of production that was once dominant, but an industry

that is created and reproduced at every moment. Just as old social perceptions are continuously created, new ones emerge in the arena of conflict, driven by rising social forces capable of speaking and of speaking forcefully to impose their vision. At the same time, these forces aim to confuse, falsify, mislead, or challenge other competing visions, particularly those present on the Internet (Foucault, 1970).

Spontaneous discourse, which is an industry built by a particular hegemony, as noted, can thus exist to protect the interests of active social forces. It serves to eliminate marginalized voices or reduce the prominence of those voices. Fanon (2015) refers to these marginalized groups as the oppressed, those without land, authority, money, culture, or platforms—people who are socially, politically, and culturally disenfranchised. These individuals see themselves only through the eyes and lenses of others. What, then, are the key characteristics of this speech?

B. Peculiarities of spontaneous speech

Spontaneous speech can be characterized by three main features. The first is stealth. It is speech that hides its true meaning, cloaking itself in words, proverbs, and vague expressions that seem to mean something but ultimately mean nothing. This speech defines itself not by what it is, but by what it is not. In order for hegemony to persist, it must never admit that it is hegemony. Instead, it must maneuver, evade, and say things without saying them directly (Bachelard, 1982).

The second characteristic is its attachment to what is called "reality." Spontaneous discourse begins with what is given, built by the active forces in social conflict, and does not seek to reconstruct it in any other way. Spontaneous discourse does not aim to address problems or the complexities of reality; rather, it simplifies and flattens it, consolidating the facts as they were constructed and imposed by the powerful, victorious forces in the arena of social conflict (Bourdieu, 1993). The third and final characteristic is its tendency toward absolute thought and its disregard for history. It seeks the process of normalization by transforming the cultural (i.e., the historical or the variable and relative) into the natural and unchanging. Herein lies its inclination toward essentialist thinking, which views a phenomenon as an independent, standalone entity that can have meaning in and of itself, without considering its broader historical or social context (Durkheim, 1982). This approach is akin to what Mills (2000) describes as using biography without confronting it with history when analyzing a specific social phenomenon. For example, attributing suicide, school success, bankruptcy, or the success of an economic project to subjective factors, such as an individual's "genius" or talent, is a form of spontaneous thinking.

In the face of this overwhelming torrent of spontaneous speech, the sociologist or anthropologist is compelled to dismantle the reality it conveys, exposing the looseness, chaos, generalizations, simplifications, and preconceived judgments embedded in ordinary language. How, then, can a researcher in the humanities work to overcome such ready-made constructions of reality and reconstruct them in a scientific manner?

2. Scientific sociology and the process of constructing the topic

What is scientific sociology? How does the process of constructing a topic take place? In contrast to natural sciences such as physics, chemistry, geology, or biology, which work on given topics like gravity, light, the layers of the earth, or living organisms, the human sciences do not have a pre-given topic. Rather, they are compelled to create their own topics from the remnants of what is provided by active forces in the arena of social conflict. In other words, the topic must be built. If we examine certain methodological guides, such as *The Craft of Sociology* by Bourdieu (1993) and his team, *Tricks of the Trade* by Becker (1998), *The Sociological Eye* by Hughes (1970), or *The Method of Sociology* by Combessie (1999), we will quickly realize that the construction process consists of formulating the problem, creating concepts, and establishing the relationships between issues—between concepts. We will focus on these two stages separately.

A. Building the problem

When we speak of constructing a problem, we mean that science does not begin with a given topic fabricated by active and speaking forces in the arena of social conflict. Rather than starting with imposed axioms or narratives accepted by all, science begins with a new construction of reality, creating a problem that the researcher himself defines. This process enables the assignment of meaning by establishing the relationships that should exist between different parts—between the subjective and the objective, or the general and the specific. As Mills suggests, it involves connecting the biographical with the historical.

When Bourdieu asks in his book *The Inheritors: Students and Culture* (1964), or in *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 2007), about the relationship between school success and cultural capital (i.e., cultural heritage), he is seeking to understand the meaning behind that success. When Weber investigates the emergence of capitalism and its connection to Protestant thought, he looks for cultural reasons alongside the economic factors behind the rise of capitalism in Western Europe (Weber, 1905). Similarly, when Foucault (1975) studies what he calls the "archaeology" of prisons and mental institutions, he aims to uncover the deeper reasons for the emergence of a hegemony that speaks alone and refuses to listen to others, labeling them as "sick" or "mad," and dismissing their words as nonsense. Prisons, mental institutions, schools, and barracks are, therefore, built to tame people and silence their voices (Foucault, 1975).

Science begins by rejecting accepted axioms and proposing new problems to understand and assign meaning. However, we must recognize that any new proposal or perspective requires the creation of new concepts. But what do we mean by this process?

B. Creating concepts in sociology: how to view reality

In his book *what is Philosophy?* And in the chapter on "Variation and Repetition," Gilles Deleuze (1968) argues that the primary task of philosophy is the creation of concepts. We argue that this essential task is not limited to philosophy but is also fundamental to all human sciences, especially sociology and anthropology. Like philosophical thinking, sociological and anthropological thinking does not begin with reality but rather moves toward it, as Gaston Bachelard suggests (Benabdel Ali, 2000). This means that sociology or anthropology must go beyond the given topics fabricated by hegemony, which are based on scattered and arbitrary elements.

Sociological or anthropological thought must not only transcend the given topic but also create new concepts. Durkheim (1897), in his study of the phenomenon of suicide, begins not with the concrete facts visible in lived reality but with abstract concepts like the suicide rate and the rate of social integration. To understand the phenomenon, Durkheim links the suicide rate to the rate of integration, emphasizing the relationships between concepts rather than between tangible things. Similarly, Marx (1867), in his analysis of exploitation, does not start from specific facts but rather from theoretical concepts such as the mode of production, relations of production, productive forces, and class.

Saussure, in his famous lectures, opens with the assertion: "The point of view creates the subject" (Saussure, 1916). This means that language as a living reality cannot be understood unless we create what Saussure calls "language." Language does not exist in reality as a tangible entity but is a concept constructed by Saussure to understand discourse—how individuals and groups use language.

All of these studies demonstrate the importance of creating abstract concepts to better approach reality. Only through the creation of concepts can we study relationships. But what do we mean by studying relationships?

C. Networking relationships between issues or concepts

"To study social phenomena as objects," as Durkheim (1985) put it, is a clear call to follow the example of the natural sciences and to view social phenomena as things that derive their meaning

not from themselves or for themselves, as if they were independent entities, but as part of a chain of significant relationships. A phenomenon, in this view, has no meaning unless it is connected to the whole of which it is a part. This approach, which we understand in the context of sociology, represents a revolutionary shift in method, one in which all the founders of the humanities—such as Marx, Weber, Saussure, Mauss, and Levi-Strauss—participated. These thinkers all broke with the positivist approach, which studies phenomena in isolation, treating them as independent entities.

Perhaps the most important lesson structuralism has taught us, from Saussure (1916) to Lévi-Strauss (1958), Foucault (1970), and Barthes (1957), is to adopt a scientific method in our analysis of things. Science, in this sense, is relational. Structuralism, therefore, focuses on studying the significant relationships within a system, seeking symmetry—what is called *structural homology*, or the recurring relationships between different systems or structures. While structuralism can be criticized in various ways, it remains a key contributor for its emphasis on studying relationships, whether within a specific system or between different systems.

We can also note that one of Max Weber's (1905) major contributions, in his study of the emergence of capitalism, was the creation of new relationships—this time cultural, rather than economic. Unlike Marx, who focused primarily on the economic factors behind the rise of capitalism in Western European cities, Weber sought to understand the cultural dimensions, particularly the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. It could also be argued that C. Wright Mills's (1959) greatest contribution lies in his concept of the *sociological imagination*, which emphasizes the need to create new relationships in order to build new problems and generate fresh sociological ideas.

However, while creating relationships between scattered elements or parts to assign meaning is necessary, it is not sufficient for constructing the entire subject of science. A new language must also be created within the dominant language, a crucial step in sociological writing.

3. Sociological writing and the need to create a new language

What does it mean to create a new language? Does this imply searching for cosmetic adornments, using rhetoric to transform ordinary, everyday language into something celebratory and grandiose? Or does it refer to reviving the project of the German philosopher and mathematician Leibniz, who aimed to create a universal, rational-mathematical language understood by all (Shiguro, 1990)? Alternatively, is a new language created within the existing language, or at least worked on from within, in order to tighten loose words and expressions? This would involve striking hard with Nietzsche's hammer on the body of ordinary language, opening cracks and gaps to allow us to express knowledge that requires precision and clarity.

The phrase "creating a new language" in this context is not about using rhetoric, metaphor, or ornamental tools to refine words and make them more polished. Nor does it suggest reviving Leibniz's project of creating a universal language. Instead, the aim is to work on spontaneous language from within, making it a tool for the sociologist or anthropologist to examine, not simply to simplify or satisfy pre-existing meanings, but to construct and create meaning. In this chapter, we will address this process in two ways: first, we will briefly explore the significant contributions of Wittgenstein, which will serve as a starting point for our thinking; second, we will present real sociological and anthropological examples that embody and support this methodology.

A. Working on language from within

The book *The Craft of Sociology* essentially discusses a crisis—or more precisely, a dilemma—the sociologist faces when forced to use ordinary language to tell the truth. To navigate this challenge with minimal loss, the sociologist or anthropologist must work on ordinary language from within, striving to make it as accurate, clear, and precise as possible. Hence, in this chapter, we will briefly consult Wittgenstein to explain this vision. What interests us is Wittgenstein's approach to working on language from within, aiming to control all the words that confuse and fail to convey meaning. He establishes boundaries for words within language and demolishes, with his "pick," the loose, resonant words that only cause confusion and chaos. He also works to eliminate rhetoric—the

ornamental tools that distort meaning—ensuring that his language does not stray into metaphysical territory. Wittgenstein's primary goal is to enable philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists to speak the language correctly, not to be spoken by it. He strikes at the body of language to break apart, or at least crack, these old expressions that are boxed in and mummified under the weight of habitual use. This approach echoes the ideas of poets and thinkers such as Mallarmé, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Derrida, and Barthes (1952). For example, Barthes, in his lectures at the Collège de France, emphasizes that we must engage with the body of language, confronting its cracks and fractures, so that we speak through it rather than letting it speak to us.

B. Living sociological and anthropological examples

We will now discuss two famous scholars—Pierre Bourdieu and Clifford Geertz—and their views on spontaneity and ordinary language.

Bourdieu's writings, particularly in *The Heirs* and *Reproduction*, show the significant influence of Wittgenstein. A quick review of these books reveals how Bourdieu adhered to Wittgenstein's ideas. In these works, the paragraphs are structured almost independently, preventing the spontaneous authority of language from seeping into the content. This method, shared by Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, ensures that the meaning of each sentence is precise, neither expanded nor narrowed beyond its intended scope. This rigor in Bourdieu's writing led some to describe it as overly difficult and inaccessible for beginners and the general reader—not because it is ambiguous, but because of its precision and clarity in defining terms and concepts. This attention to detail seems to have become ingrained in Bourdieu's personality, as seen not only in his writing but also in his conversations, where he often stutters, reflecting his constant struggle with ordinary language and his perpetual search for the "right word" in the right place.

As for Clifford Geertz, the renowned American anthropologist, his work also emphasizes the importance of language and writing. In his book *Acts and Biographies* (1988), Geertz explores the relationship between the anthropologist and writing. He argues that being an anthropologist means being a writer who can speak with clarity about the peoples and cultures he or she studies. For Geertz, anthropological work does not simply involve collecting data and presenting it in a sterile, factual style. Instead, it is about creating a text that translates and interprets the cultures and people studied in a way that speaks eloquently and meaningfully. Geertz rejects the idea of simply gathering data— what he calls "counting the cats in Zanzibar"—and instead emphasizes the creation of deep, meaningful texts that speak to the complexities of the human experience. In this sense, anthropology, like literature, starts not from reality or spontaneous language but from an imaginative construction of reality, which allows for the creation of a more profound understanding. The example of Claude Lévi-Strauss's "Bororos" in *The Sad Orbits* illustrates how anthropological writing can transcend simple descriptions, offering a deeper and more nuanced perspective on the lived reality of the people studied (Doaja, 2008).

RESULTS AND PERSPECTIVES

In this paper, we aimed to articulate the following idea: the production of knowledge in the field of humanities is based on three pivotal stages. First and foremost, there is no science without debate, and no debate without an ongoing struggle with spontaneous language and the ideas and narratives it generates. These narratives often speak in the voice of one power against another in the arena of social conflict. Therefore, it is essential to challenge, or at least contain, all ready-made concepts and frameworks.

Secondly, there is no science without the process of construction. This refers to the construction of issues and concepts—starting not from reality, but from the sociological imagination, as Mills defines it. This allows us to dismantle and reconstruct the given subject scientifically.

Thirdly, we must work with ordinary language to open spaces within it that enable us to speak scientifically. It is beneficial for sociologists and anthropologists to have a solid foundation in digital technologies or measurement techniques and tools. However, while this foundation is important, it

will be of little use to the researcher or society if the researcher lacks the ability to write and formulate ideas effectively. Without this skill, and without belonging to a particular sociological school or current that enables clear insight, the process of intellectual production and the creation of thinkers becomes stagnant in our Arab universities. In such institutions, we end up with the production of technicians and, at best, experts, rather than critical thinkers.

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