



RESEARCH ARTICLE

Musical Trends and Social Movements: Examining the Role of Pop Music in Cultural Shifts Rap as an Indicator of the Protest Potential of Generation Z

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
Received: Sep 29, 2024 Accepted: Nov 9, 2024	The article analyzes the contexts of the protest potential of young people in the musical direction popular among contemporary youth - rap. Attempts to impose a political identity "from above" do not satisfy the needs of the youth, who strive for self-realization in the cultural sphere. Therefore, the article explores the socio-psychological phenomenon of such a youth public practice as rap culture, which today has turned into a brand of mass pop culture. Based on sociological data, the author analyzes the social mood and current problems of Thai youth, constructing their protest potential. A fairly high percentage of young respondents were identified who are concerned about the violation of their legitimate social, civil and political rights. It is noted that Generation Z prefers non-political forms of protest to means of cultural expression. The idea of rap as "protest music" became firmly established in the mass consciousness. The historical and cultural retrospective of the origin and development of rap allowed the author to refute the established stereotype and support the position of rap as the music of success and an active life position. The relevance and scientific novelty of the issue made it possible to show the importance of studying the protest behavior of young people in the modern scientific space, highlight its indicators and draw a conclusion about the need for the psychological study of protest tendencies of young people. people and pedagogical support for the socialization process.
Keywords Youth Generation z Hip-hop culture Counterculture Rap music Political socialization Social mood Youth protests Protest behavior Protest potential Gangsta rap Underground mainstream	

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INTRODUCTION

The scandalous events of recent years surrounding Thai rap artists have intensified the discussion about the destructive content of youth music and its influence on modern teenagers not only in Thailand but also in the Southeast Asian region. Scientific organizations have engaged in serious sociological analysis of the problem of protest feelings among students (Damodaran, 2016). Following this interest in the problem, we will try to understand the psychology of persistent "moral panic" around rap music as protest music, as the ideological basis of the protest potential of the generation of young Thais born at the beginning of this millennium.

The basic theoretical premise for the analysis of protest feelings of the younger generation is socialization as a complex indicator, which in the conditions of postmodern society forms such a basic

property of youth as subjectivity, demonstrating a permanent transition from the primary property of being the object of social influence to the primary property of being the subject of socially transformative activity. In other words, youth is rightly considered both as an object of education and as a subject of social action. This situation determines not only the inclination but also the readiness for socio-political changes, which, in turn, creates an illusion among the power structures about suppressing or mobilizing young people into different socio-political configurations, public organizations, associations, movements, etc.

Statement of the problem

The twentieth century created many illusory ideas about youth, both idealistic [Pilkington, 376] and pessimistic [Brake, 238]. However, practice shows that the real situation in the youth environment cannot be considered without a strictly scientific approach to the problems of the younger generation, a deep study of its values, social attitudes towards life, current behavioral strategies and models in specific cultural and historical conditions.

The authors of the theory of generations, popular among sociologists, the American economist Neil Howe and the historian William Strauss, believe that the conflict of generations is not connected with age contradictions, but with certain cultural and historical conditions of socialization, when most people still have such values (Strauss & Howe, 1992) in Thai, in the past a new, unique generation has been formed - the "Z generation". On the one hand, it is a generation of those who grew up in an unstable transitional society and had a difficult period of formation.

In Thailand, under the influence of globalization, a new, unique generation - "Generation Z" - was formed. On the one hand, it is a generation of those who grew up in an unstable transitional society and had a difficult period of formation (in the interpretation of Howe-Strauss - Generation Y, born 1985-1999). On the other hand, with the gradual improvement of socio-economic conditions and with the development of market relations, a generation was formed that is more optimistic and self-confident about the future, but at the same time experiences ideological indifference. In this case, we are talking about Generation Z (born after 2000), who is indifferent to current events in public life and is absorbed in the egocentric atmosphere of social networks and the cult of narcissism and carelessness. From the point of view of public interests, "such mass sentiments testify, firstly, to the accumulation of destructive political potential of young people, which over time can become a destabilizing social factor, and secondly, to the fact that in the process of education, young people do not acquire but lose the sense of citizenship" (op. cit.). In this sense, the study before you about Generation Z is of great interest. Researchers have found that this generation is characterized not by open rebellion but by quiet resistance. So, the number of those potentially ready to go to street protests (compared to those who will not go to them under any circumstances) is much higher.

Modern boys and girls do not strive for drastic changes, but value comfort and tranquility. At the same time, they have a deeply personal perception of social injustice, therefore, potentially, assimilating existing and new social norms, political values, behavioral models and cultural patterns in the process of political socialization, there are risks of an outpouring of youth protests (Lertchoosakul, 2023).

This is the song of my generation. You can't bring my generation to its knees. That's why our rap text is the street. And if there are bullets, there are no pit bulls in this world. My generation is still.

Rap Against Dictatorship

Social philosophy interprets social protest, on the one hand, as a reaction to the living conditions of an individual, depending on the degree of his internal freedom, and on the other, as a reaction of internal freedom to the conditions of external unfreedom. Hence, any factors and means (physical,

mental, intellectual, etc.) can act as a trigger for protest actions. Everything depends on the compliance of the social environment with the needs and internal freedom of the individual. If such a correspondence is present, then there are no conditions for protest, otherwise, the individual enters into conflict and resists.

Results of the study and their discussion. In Southeast Asia, Thailand has established itself as a leader in the modernization of all aspects of public life. However, despite the rather high indicators of socio-economic development and the trend of long-term economic growth, the socio-political situation in the country is alarming. The reason for this anxiety is the striking stratification of society according to the level of income and, as a result, the polarization of the social mood of the population. Social mood is the emotional and psychological state of people, and their behavior, which depends on the degree of solving social problems, contradictions, and satisfaction of social interests, refracted through the psyche, consciousness, and determination of social behavior of individuals (Lakkis, 2017). In other words, social mood is the result of mastering social practice in the actual activity of an individual, which is expressed in his emotional state, state of mind, value orientations, and social attitudes. As shown by numerous sociological studies, the social mood of young people generally has positive trends, which is quite natural against the background of economic growth and a stable socio-political situation in the country (table 1).

Table 1 socio-political situation in the country

Assessment of the political situation in the country (by gender and age, in%)

Gradations	14-18 years old		19-25 years old		26-29 years old	
	husband.	wives	husband.	wives	husband.	wives
Prosperous	25.8	23.1	21.5	20.1	20.7	19.9
Calm	43.5	49.2	56.2	50.8	59.2	55.5
Tense	11.3	7.7	9.4	11.0	7.8	10.4
Crisis	4.8	6.2	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.2
I find it difficult to answer	11.3	13.8	10.9	15.7	9.0	11.4

The analysis of the social well-being of young people in the current socio-political and socio-economic situation in the country allows us to identify not only positive trends, but also current problems of young Thais, which differ in great diversity and content. The rating is dominated by numerous problems of a socio-political nature: migration problems, violation of individual rights and freedoms, growth of youth deviance and crime, youth subcultures, etc.

Table 2 Current Problems of Kazakhstan

Current problems of modern Kazakhstan in the assessments of young people
(in general and by nationality, in%)

Gradations	Generally	Nationality		
		Kazakhs	Russians	others
Corruption, abuse of government	44.3	43.0	45.7	45.5
Migration processes (population outflow, refugees)	10.6	9.1	14.2	9.4
Failure to respect rights and freedoms	19.1	20.5	17.3	18.5
Violation of rights based on nationality	7.8	6.1	10.3	9.4
Decline in the level of human culture	22.8	22.0	24.7	21.2
Activities of foreign companies	8.5	10.7	6.5	4.8
Spread of drugs and drug trafficking	31.6	32.9	29.5	31.2
Increase in crime among youth	29.8	29.8	29.6	30.9
Indifference of authorities to the needs of young people	11.6	11.4	11.5	12.7
Environmental pollution	23.6	24.4	22.4	24.5
Growing influence on Kazakhstan from foreign countries	6.9	7.5	6.7	5.2
The threat of military conflicts from the territory of neighboring states	6.1	5.6	7.4	5.8
The threat of religious extremism and international terrorism	9.1	9.4	7.2	12.1
Language problem	15.9	13.4	19.7	17.0
Stratification of the population into rich and poor	17.9	18.3	18.0	16.7
I find it difficult to answer	4.5	4.9	3.7	3.9

The analysis of the results of our sociological research showed that almost all the most urgent problems that directly affect the social mood of young people stem from the socio-political and

moral-psychological situation in the country. Thus, for 43.6% of young people, the most urgent problem of Thai society is corruption, bribery and abuse in the authorities. Given that the indicators for this variable are approximately the same in all age groups, it can be concluded that this social disease has penetrated all spheres of society. Every young Thai faces it, starting from school, and often without suppressing its manifestation, adapting, he begins to perceive it as a norm of public life - this is how the 45.9% of respondents who did not answer this question can be interpreted.

Sociological research in recent years shows that youth protest is directly related to the level of observance of civil rights and freedoms in the country [Teslenko: 304; Youth of Central Asia: 386]. True, the value judgments of young Kazakhstanis regarding the nature of compliance with their legal rights and freedoms differ somewhat. Thus, about half of the respondents said that their rights are not guaranteed (13.9%) or rather not guaranteed (32.3%). The study shows that infringement of individual rights and freedoms is the main motive for political protest. At the same time, a citizen's protest repertoire depends on his legal consciousness, legal culture, and education (Table 3).

The socio-psychological foundation of protest sentiments is the phenomenon of deprivation as "a subjective feeling of dissatisfaction with one's present, a discrepancy between value expectations and real possibilities" (Ünalı, 2013). Sociology shows that the presence of a "youth hillock" (an unusually high proportion of young people aged 15-25 years in the socio-demographic structure of society) throughout the history of mankind has been an invariable companion to political crises and revolutions, which are based on objective and subjective factors (everyday difficulties, status positions, psychological problems, etc.), as well as socio-technological constructs of manipulation and zombification.

In socio-political sciences, the term "protest behavior" is widely used to analyze the protest behavior of young people as a form of political participation, which is the public expression of an individual or a group of people of their dissatisfaction with something, most often "the existing socio-political system or the individual results of its functioning through various forms protest activities" (Pickard, 2019). However, the above definition is somewhat inaccurate about the younger generation, which is characterized by low involvement in political configurations and activities of formal socio-political institutions. In this context, it is more appropriate to use another term - "protest potential", which "in the political space characterizes the possibility of changing the political existence of various political actors, the threat of destabilization of political configurations, as well as other social transformations" (2013). In other words, the protest potential is a set of factors structured around the expression of various forms of dissatisfaction with subjects of social action in different spheres of society, including non-political forms of protest.

Table 3 Protest potential of young people (by education, %)

Table 3

Protest potential of young people (by education, %)							
No.	Protest form	Total	Including by level of education				
			incomplete average	general average	average specialist	unfinished higher	higher
1	Rallies	11.0	20.9	11.2	9.8	11.1	10.3
2	Picketing	3.0	4.7	5.0	1.9	4.0	2.5
3	Letter to international organizations	10.2	8.1	6.7	8.4	13.7	10.3
4	Letter to local authorities	21.4	18.6	21.3	22.1	21.2	21.5
5	Letters to central authorities	12.9	15.1	12.5	13.6	10.6	14.0
6	Complaints	8.5	3.5	9.2	7.9	10.1	9.0
7	Publications in the media	10.5	12.8	9.6	12.5	11.6	9.1
8	Active resistance	1.8	1.2	2.1	2.2	1.4	1.8
9	Other	2.1	1.2	1.3	1.9	0.9	3.4
10	I find it difficult to answer	17.0	12.8	20.0	18.5	13.9	17.0

The state imposes political identities on youth, while youth seek spaces for cultural expression. The most important changes occur not in the political, but in the cultural struggle - in the field of redistribution of the right to cultural dominance; the content (motivation, direction) of modern youth

“protests” are associated not with politics, but with cultural power. This cultural struggle takes on many forms, but it is always inevitable, at the same time dynamic, never waged in the same forms, for the same values and meanings. Thus, in the 1960s and 70s, rock was associated with “protest music,” and today it is rap music.

Originating in the "colored" neighborhoods of American cities in the area of the hip-hop movement, rap (literally, "rhythmic poetry") developed a specific language of protest that distinguishes it from other youth subcultures and demonstrates its countercultural nature:

- propaganda of individual freedom and autonomy of young people, independence from the political mainstream;
- aggressiveness and sharpness of expression in speeches and polemics;
- high degree of emotionality of statements together with their inconsistency;
- Uncertainty, contradiction, illogicality are characteristic features of slogans, polemics and everyday speech;
- universality and unaddressed appeals, which additionally increases the fluctuations of the mood of the crowd depending on "thrown" information;
- contrasts of values and "anti-values" in polemical texts, slogans, and everyday speech, often associated with absurd interpretations;
- calls for a fight against the enemy (taking into account the vagueness of the concept of "enemy", the energy of the masses can be turned against any opponent) (Danaher, 2010).

Since its inception, South Asian rap has been realized as a commercial project, and the ideology of hip-hop has been embodied only on stage, not in real life. But such music cannot exist without struggle and conflict, so gradually performers found new ideas for conflict situations. Rappers with a strong subversive potential appeared in almost all the foundations of Southeast Asia.

Over the past decade, a South Asian segment of the Internet has formed that dynamically develops the rap underground (Rap Against Dictatorship, Youth Thu, SoWhat), whose socially conscious songs have become an outlet for social protest, thus raising hot topics such as drugs, police brutality and social justice. South Asian music critics rightly point out that rap has surpassed all other music genres in terms of honesty and willingness to touch on topics that are inconvenient for the authorities. In terms of song content, our rappers are much more socially active and articulate than our rockers, not to mention pop stars.

Moreover, for rap music, the Internet has become a more powerful media resource than television or radio. And considering that generation Z was "born with a button on their finger", then every teenager in the modern world of technology and social networks has the opportunity for creative self-knowledge. Such accessibility and simplicity in creating rap compositions allows them to compete with professional musicians, touching on the most relevant and sensitive topics. Music critics note that in terms of the meaning of the lyrics and the discussion of protest ideas in the songs, Russian rap has become similar to punk rock, which at one point criticized those in power.

The majority of young Tanlanders are either apolitical or completely loyal to the authorities. In this sense, it is indicative that rap culture in Thailand developed in the early 2000s as part of the entertainment and dance world. Elements of American rap and local traditions were taken as a basis, many motifs, ideas, and texts were directly copied from the works of Western artists.

Case Study: Thailand - a radical cultural force

In the music videos of YoungBong (IB) or Juu4E, it can be seen tattooed members of Thailand's lower class going "wild" to hip-hop or trap music. Filmed in ten-dollar hotels, these videos are extremely

popular despite the low budget. They generate millions of clicks and speak to fans and casual listeners with an entertaining brand of nihilism and rejection of mainstream Thai society. The mainstream has almost completely ignored this culture and its message. Yet it is by far the most radical and transformative political interpretation of the nation. If you really want to understand this, you should definitely watch the Klong Toei music video.

In 2018, the Rap Against Dictatorship video caused a stir in Thailand. It attracted international attention and spawned dozens of opinions from across the spectrum of Thai politics. He mostly focuses on the 'radical' message of the video and lyrics. They describe a corrupt nation controlled by the military and silenced by a lack of freedom of expression. Since then, the success of rising politician Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and his Future Forward party has led to a national dialogue on the culture war between young reformers and the institutional "old powers".

'Beneath' this well-educated and articulate vision of society, however, there still exists a related radical variant of the underclass. Their representatives do not have a university degree and do not own expensive shirts and shoes. Their view of the world is shaped by the experience of systematic oppression, exploitation and corruption. They come from a class of society that has no vocabulary or means to express themselves directly. Their way of life clearly represents their rejection of the dominant 'high society' culture. Their means of protest: facial tattoos, drugs and trap music. For them, a more liberalized society offers little opportunity to initiate radical change in terms of their economic and social disadvantage. Therefore, Future Forward did not seek to cooperate with them or vice versa (Ockey, 2020).

This form of lower class expression is nothing new. It came to prominence in the West through the punk movement of the 1980s. But like any culture under neoliberalism, punk gradually became palatable to the middle class, dismantled, commercialized, and largely integrated into mainstream culture (Cashell, 2019). The commercialization of protest music is repeated all over the world and this has also happened with Thai trap music and culture. Rapper Youngom, for example, went from a musical nobody to the top of the charts in a year. Youngohm's music often incorporates traditional Thai elements as well as trends and culture from the American hip hop scene, as he himself proudly explains The song that marked his breakthrough, Choei Monei, garnered far more views than Rap Against Dictatorship (op.cit). For now, however, Thailand's underclass still offers plenty of political potential. Many of the songs focus on lack of opportunity, poverty and class consciousness (along with lyrics about drugs and women). The song Khlong Toei by 19 TIGER x H3NRI is a great example.

Although the musical styles are miles apart, late 1970s communist revolutionaries and protest musicians such as Caravan and early Plerng Phue Chivit used the same narrative techniques in their music. Now, as then, artists and their followers make astute social observations about the inequality they endure. If this potential is harnessed properly, it could lead to truly radical changes. The last time something like this happened, it inspired a communist revolution. This can be seen in the example of the Pleng Pue Chee Wit generation (Eamsa-Ard, 2006). However, much has changed for the lower class since the 1970s. A greater sense of nihilism and despair has become apparent, not least because of Thailand's massive prison population (which has the fourth-highest incarceration rate in the world). It has become all too common for members of the working class to end up with heavy and long prison sentences. The increasing urbanization of the Thai working class, as well as the cultural impact of globalization, have also given rise to a more nihilistic ideology. However, the key themes of economic and social repression remain unchanged. Perhaps in the future, a modern version of the 1970s dissident folk band 'Nga' Caravan will emerge as a real radical threat to Thailand's higher institutions (op. cit). Until then, the underclassmen will probably continue to do what they do best: live in the moment, do drugs, and make music.

Rap Against Dictatorship is a provocative, direct nature of the music and accompanying videos that is the government's retaliation for public attention to politics. Hip hop is considered one of the most

influential genres of dance. A sense of trust between marginalized listeners and rappers fostered openness, facilitating community organizing. "Prathet Ku me" turns other violence against protesters and corruption into incendiary caravan music of the 70s. Transparent lyrics that deal directly with topics like corruption. Prayut, the rewriting of the constitution and the reorganization of the monarchy are also more effective in bringing about changes as RAD makes specific demands. The government's stifling of free speech is denigrated by one particularly inflammatory section:

*The country that pointed a gun at your throat,
He claims he has freedom, but he has no right to choose.
You can't say anything even though your mouth is full.
Whatever you do, the leader will see you.
The country that asshole owns sovereignty,
You have to choose to eat the truth or the bullets.
The land that the big fish eat a little from the squad of fuckers,
What is my country?*

Rap is always answered by its ability to speak not only through music, but also through video, art, now and social media. It especially made it difficult for hip hop to respond well and made censorship difficult. Furthermore, the protective effect of watching or listening to music is reduced. Hip hop focuses on the lyrics and not the instrumentation, making it easier for the artists to convey their message and the music for themselves to the audience. In his protest songs, RAD adopted this philosophy; a quick scan of their music shows that they usually use a single, unobtrusive instrumental loop and a trap beat underneath their vocals. This traditional music placed emphasis on the instruments and emphasized the importance of observing the details so as to gain insight. As a result, the popular song "Prathet Ku me" became the object of their admiration, surpassing even the rhythm. In fact, this practice has been used by collectives in more local capacities than RAD across Southeast Asia, such as Borneo Menace - two brothers who create and send beat packs for anyone in the community to lay down a vocal track. Especially for young voters who came of age after the coup d'état in 2014, RAD took advantage of this accessibility. And just crushing RAD alienated their young voter base, but allowing them to continue would further expose the government's flaws and corruption. Even after the 2019 elections, Prayut and the government face an inevitable dilemma (Jocuns, 2022)

In Thailand in 2020, the passion and turbulence of the decade 2005 to 2014 seems a long way off. After six years of economic stagnation and political re-education, most working-class and middle-class Thais are too busy with daily survival and too intimidated by the world's strictest lèse-majesté and computer crime laws to raise their voices in anger. As Gabriel Ernst demonstrates in this issue, nihilistic and anti-establishment-oriented music still permeates radical youth cultures and slums. But overall, the Thai music scene has cooled down as much as the political climate. In fact, it can be argued that the overwhelming impact of the rap song Prathet ku mi has been heightened by the almost complete absence of protest music within Thailand since General Prayut Chan-o-cha came to power.

The decade of (musical) protests is over. The current stagnation makes the years 2005 to 2014 seem all the more remarkable. This was a time when almost every genre of music available in Thailand (even Western classical music) was used for protests and expressions of opinion – which seems extremely dangerous today.

It all started with Thaksin Shinawatra... except that it didn't. The 2014 coup was part of a cycle that dates back to the 1932 revolution, when a small group of army officers and civilian activists wrested power from an unpopular and outdated absolute monarchy. The revolutionaries formed the first Thai political party, wrote the first Thai constitution, held the first elections in 1933, and changed the name of the country from Kingdom of Siam to Thailand, which means "land of the free." They even released a new national anthem (Phleng-Chat), which aired daily at 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. and before every cinema screening. Now, ironically, those who refuse to stand up for the Phleng chat before a movie face up to fifteen years in prison for lèse-majesté.

Soon after the election, the Yellow Shirts street protests began in Bangkok, and the participation of many professional songwriters led to a flood of original, professionally recorded satirical songs. One of these early protest songs was "Corruption" by Wichaya "Nong" Vatanasapt, a member of the legendary Thai ska band T-Bone. The verses mirrored Thaksin's greed ("Day by day you think, you think of what law can bring you money back / If you can't find it, then you write your own law to line your pockets") with the loyalty of a dog: "Even dogs know the goodness of men, whether rich or poor, never proud, faithful to their owner ... let the dog teach you." This comparison referred to King Bhumibol's famous children's book about his favorite dog, Thong Daeng, who was respectful and well-behaved, even though he came from a humble background. The last part of the song was a rapped curse that called on "holy spirits all over the universe" to make this thief suffer: "Stay close, pay your karma, in the prison of the dark place / Forever the fire of hell burns you". The message was clear: 'low-born' Thais should know their place.

The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), led by media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, was formally formed on 8 February 2006 to protest Thaksin's alleged corruption and usurpation of the king's role. With a base of support made up of Bangkokians and southerners from the middle and upper classes, conservative factions of the Thai army, the Democratic Party (liberal and conservative-leaning), some NGOs and trade unions, the PAD was characterized by ultra-nationalist, pro-monarchical rhetoric and the wearing of yellow – the official color of the Thai king.

Within a month, the professionally produced song Ai na liam (Square Face) was broadcast in the pro-opposition Thai media. Apart from attacking corruption, the songwriters denounced populist policies such as the 30-baht health system and the One Million Houses Across the Country program: "The deceptive Uea Athon House, of inferior quality than if you built it yourself." The music of Ai na liam was a mixture of funk and rap with a chorus typical of the central Thai folk song genre of lamtat. It thus confirmed the central Thai hegemony of Bangkok and excluded the main areas of support for Thaksin, who favored the Lao-Israeli folk song genre Morlam and the hybrid folk song genre Luk Thung.

CONCLUSION

The protest field of rap is increasingly moving into the sphere of amateur, so-called "backyard" rap, analogous to American gangsta rap (gangsta rap), which professes an aggressively provocative ideology of the urban periphery, swearing and "criminal" romance. Despite the lyrical content of the repertoire of rap artists, their music remains the voice of the generation of the 2000s, striving to live in a new way, asserting new values and the meaning of life. Findings. The analysis of rap texts allows us to identify indicators of the protest potential of young people:

- Lack of life experience and low level of education;
- low social status, dependent position on other people (older generation, parents, etc.);
- perception of protest behavior and protest actions as an integral element of social life;
- identity crisis, intrapersonal conflict, feeling of dissatisfaction with one's own life;
- less, unlike the youth protest movements of the Soviet era (dissidenting), the desire to sacralize the protest and the desire to give it a certain "halo of sanctity";
- dissatisfaction with the policy of the country's leadership, the desire for change;
- low level of legal and political culture;
- a relatively high possibility of mobilization for participation in political conflicts due to a number of factors (age characteristics, absence or low degree of expression of family and career obligations among the majority of representatives, etc.);
- situational interest in politics, expressed in selective interest in certain political events;
- insufficient status of young people in socio-political relations (social elevators that involve them in these relations do not work effectively enough)

However, it should be borne in mind that rap culture is not a dominant trend among young people (at least in Kazakhstan), so in terms of working with young people, the specific characteristics of generation Z should be taken into account:

- slow political participation at the local and national level;
- limited information about events in the country and abroad only at the level of the news feed of social networks;
- In general, apolitical behavior and hedonistic attitudes towards the comfort of life;
- the desire to avoid possible threats of repression by the authorities (police, employers, university administrations);
- lack of material resources for the period of protest.





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