



## RESEARCH ARTICLE

## Anglo – German Naval agreement 1935

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
Received: May 22, 2024	The British-German Maritime Agreement was concluded on 18 June 1935 in London in the form of an exchange of notes between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the representative of the Third Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop. In this agreement, the British government accepted Germany's right to expand its naval forces to 35% of the combined naval forces of members of the Commonwealth of Nations. From a military standpoint, this meant that the German Navy's global payload could be quadrupled (from the level of 108,000 tons granted to Germany in the Treaty of Versailles to 420,500 tons). From a formal and legal point of view, the agreement meant the review of the Treaty of Versailles and the legitimization by Great Britain of Adolf Hitler's condemnation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles in March 1935. In the political dimension, the Convention highlighted the tendency of British politics to seek agreement with Berlin by revising the Versailles system as part of the so-called policy of appeasement. It also meant breaking the joint British-French-Italian front towards Germany and abandoning the policy of assuming the consent of western powers.
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### ANGLO GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT 1935

In 1933-1935, British diplomacy tried unsuccessfully to push across the political line on the assumption that Germany did not have the right to unilaterally liberate itself from the Treaty's disarmament obligations contained in part V of the Treaty of Versailles. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the British delegation sought to promote the principle of "qualitative disarmament", which, in London's belief, would meet German demands for equal rights in armaments ("Gleichberechtigung"). But the problem was that France refused to reduce its military force without additional security assurances, which the British were not willing to give to it.<sup>(1)</sup> This issue dominated the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and the great Powers decided to include Germany's principle of equal rights" in armaments in the Convention on Disarmament.<sup>(2)</sup>

British efforts were made in 1933 in an attempt to reconcile Germany's and France's positions in order to "bind" Germany to the provisions of the Disarmament Convention, but this was not realistic, as the British showed a tendency to give the German side greater arms concessions, while they had nothing to offer France in the area of security. They were also interested in preserving the British

<sup>(1)</sup> F.O.23/77. CABINET 53 (33). Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on WEDNESDAY, 18th OCTOBER, 1933, at 11.0

<sup>(2)</sup> Forstmeier, Friedrich. "Stellung und Disziplinarbefugnisse des Ersten Offiziers a Bord von Kriegsschiffen der deutschen Marine, 1847- 1945." Marine-Rundschau 66 (1969): 39-40

plan issued on 16 March 1933. (Macdonald Plan), which states that Germany has the right to have an army of 200 thousand troops But it has kept restrictions on German air and naval weapons and on equipping the German army with heavy weapons, The conclusion in June 1935 of the British-German Bilateral Agreement on Maritime Armaments was largely the result of the failure of attempts to develop a global disarmament convention under the auspices of the League of Nations. Referring to the provisions of the preamble to part V of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Government demanded equal rights in armaments, and argued that disarmament was the way for Berlin to rearm the German State (1933).<sup>(3)</sup>

The idea of the British-German maritime convention was that of Hitler. Admiral Ryder was positively leaning towards such an understanding, but he was sceptical about whether it would lead to lasting peace, and the latter convinced Hitler to increase the German ratio with respect to the British Navy to 35% to ensure that German shipyards were improved according to growing demand for new construction. It was believed that the maritime convention would meet the need for increased demand; under which maritime plans will be implemented on a consistent and continuous basis. "<sup>(4)</sup> Ryder expected Britain to also find advantages in concluding a British-German agreement with some maritime rearming measures. A small proportion of the British Navy would alleviate British concern about the recurrence of the maritime arms race during the pre-World War I phase. Germany will unilaterally limit its naval forces without Britain giving up anything in return; this would show that adherence to continental policy takes precedence over global policy. Although it is true that the maritime clauses of the Treaty of Versailles will be abolished under such an agreement, Germany's maritime arrangement on a voluntary basis will replace it<sup>(5)</sup> . According to this, Joachim von Ribbentrop met Anthony Eden<sup>6</sup> and Sir John Simon <sup>7</sup>Between twelfth and thirteenth November 1934.<sup>(8)</sup> He tried to ascertain their views on a British-German convention and discuss maritime issues. Ribbentrop stated that Germany did not want war with Britain, since a British-German agreement on the military could be arranged. Nor was she willing to repeat Germany's maritime policy before the Great War. Germany wanted to reach a long-term maritime agreement that would provide the security Britain needed, although it did not provide any figures. Eden expressed interest in Ribbentrop's comments but did not enquire about any details. The latter later proposed to make

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<sup>(3)</sup> H. Haraszti, Treaty-breakers or 'Realpolitiker'? The Anglo-German naval agreement of June 1935, Boppard am Rhein, 1974),p 19.

<sup>(4)</sup> leibovitz, Clement.In our time : the Chamberlain-Hitler collusion. Publisher.New York : Monthly Review Press.1998.p.176

<sup>(5)</sup> E.L. Woodward, M.A.great Britain and the german navy. Publisher.oxford & the clarendon press.USA.1935.p.188

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Aiden: (1897-1977) A British Tory politician and diplomat with a long career, mostly in foreign affairs, Eden joined the King's Royal Rifle Corps and reached the Western Front and participated in his first fight in May 1916. And that same year, the Battle of Gotland. Eden won the military cross and as a result Eden was promoted to assistant. On 26 May 1918, he was promoted to Major General of the 198th Infantry Brigade, the youngest to ever be in the British Army, and in 1955 he became Prime Minister when Winston Churchill retired. In January 1957, Eden resigned. He was knighted in 1954 and Earl in 1961. For more views:

The gardian newspaper: Sir Anthony Eden resigned as Prime Minister following ill health and controversy surrounding the Suez crisis. By Our Political Correspondent.Thu 10 Jan 1957 .p.11.

<sup>7</sup> John Simon, (1873-1954) was a liberal politician and prominent lawyer. He was Home Secretary (1935-197), playing an important role in the abdication crisis, and a pivotal role in British-German relations, but as Treasury Secretary (1937-1940), his cautious financial control failed to take sufficient account of the need for rearming. In 1940 Churchill sent him to the House of Lords as Lord Chancellor, a position his legal talents well qualified for. For More Look

David Dutton.Simon and Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1935

Review of International Studies.Vol. 20, No. 1 Published By: Cambridge University Press.(Jan., 1994),p.52

<sup>(8)</sup> Joachim von Ribbentrop (April 30, 1893 - October 16, 1946) was a German politician and a prominent member of the Nazi Party. Between 1938 and 1945, born in his home city of Weisel in Germany, he served as foreign minister, playing a key role in negotiating the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. In 1945, Ribbentrop was arrested by allies, convicted in the Nuremberg trials, and sentenced to death. He was executed on 16 October 1946. For more please see

personal contact between Eden and Simon and between him in 1935. Eden believed that after a good referendum talks might resume in February or March of the same year.<sup>(9)</sup>

The British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps<sup>(10)</sup>, made a statement on 27 November 1934, concerning the British parliamentary debate on defence that was about to begin the following day. On the same day, Hitler met with Phipps and tried to allay the British government's concerns about Germany's programme to increase its ground forces. Hitler took a defensive stance: "What exactly does Britain want from us?"<sup>(11)</sup>

Germany has announced its willingness to enter into a British-German maritime agreement limiting the German navy to 35% of the British Navy. Germany would not be lower than the Soviet Union, which has the same proportion in the Baltic region, and could stand up to France, if it ventured into the war by entering the Baltic Sea.<sup>(12)</sup> The British response was that Britain wanted to reach a general agreement. A bilateral agreement would create the same situation that prevailed in Europe before the First World War in 1914. Hitler announced that he was not considering building the German Navy to oppose Britain. 35% is the German right to possess maritime capabilities commensurate with the British Navy. However, the British side did not wish to discuss the figures at this time with Hitler.<sup>(13)</sup>

Ryder had a conversation with G.C. Gold (G.C gold), British naval attaché in Berlin on November 7th and 20th, 1934, presenting Germany's position on its maritime weapons issue. Preliminary discussions have already taken place in London between France, Italy, Britain, Japan and America on the upcoming maritime conference. Although the conference is increasingly likely not to succeed in finding an appropriate maritime formula that may be agreed upon by all major powers, the conference will be important for lesser maritime powers. "Germany wanted equality in maritime armaments," Ryder continued. Versailles' maritime items, which determined Germany in terms of the size of its ships and weapons, the use of aircraft, and prevented the construction of submarines, had to be abolished. Germany can accept this only if the same laws are imposed on all maritime powers equally. Finally, if the London Maritime Conference ends without agreement on the limitation or reduction of maritime weapons, Germany will seek agreement with each of the great Powers on

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<sup>(9)</sup> Quoted in: Wark, Wesley K. *The ultimate enemy : British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939*. Publisher. Ithaca : Cornell University Press. 1985. pp. 77-78

<sup>(10)</sup> Eric Phipps, a British politician and diplomat, was born Sir Eric Phipps on 27 October 1875 and is the only son of Sir Constantine Phipps, Her Majesty's Minister in Brussels, 1900-1906. Phipps entered the diplomatic corps in 1899 and was attached to His Majesty's Embassy in Paris, then in Constantinople, Rome, and in Paris again in 1909, where he was the private secretary of the Ambassador (later Lord Bertie). He served as Ambassador in Petrograd, 1912, Madrid, 1913, Paris, 1916. He was British Secretary to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Assistant Secretary to the Foreign Office, 1919-1920, and Adviser to Her Majesty's Embassy in Brussels. 1920-1922. Phipps held the following positions: Minister Plenipotentiary of Paris, 1922-1928, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy of Vienna, 1928-1933, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Berlin, 1933-1937 and Paris, 1937-1939. He was attached to the British delegation at the Hague Reparations Conferences in August 1929 and January 1930. He retired from the diplomatic service in 1939. For more please see

Michael Dockrill . *The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939* by John Herman *British Establishment Perspectives on France, 1936-40* *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, Vol. 32, and No. 1 Publisher. New York. Francis and Taylor (Spring, 2000), pp. 167-169

<sup>(11)</sup> Gatzke, Hans Wilhelm. *European diplomacy between two wars, 1919-1939*. Publisher. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1972. p. 187

<sup>(12)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 189

<sup>(13)</sup> Wark, Wesley. *op.cit.* p. 81

an individual basis. Maritime talks with Britain would be the least difficult, as Germany had no intention of igniting a British-German maritime arms race. <sup>(14)</sup>

The Great Power talks in London reached a deadlock in late December 1934. The United States government has favored a comprehensive 20% reduction in sea cargo set by the Washington and London Maritime Treaties. On the other hand, Japan wanted to get rid of the pedigree system. She wanted to replace it with the Common Upper Limit. Each superpower will be free to quantify the payload required to defend the State so that it does not exceed this "limit". Furthermore, it is no longer possible to build ships' categories that Japan thought were offensive (warships, cruisers with major weapons of more than 8 inches and aircraft carriers). Despite the approval of America's plan to reduce the total payload of the great Powers, Britain has taken a compromise position in the deliberations. Britain has developed a plan with qualitative limitations: reducing the calibre of the cannon in individual categories of vessels and reducing the size of ships in each category. Since each force had its own restriction reduction programme, it was difficult to reach a settlement. <sup>(15)</sup>

The German Navy did not believe that the London Maritime Conference would result in a new maritime treaty for great powers. Hitler was therefore particularly interested in arranging bilateral maritime negotiations between Germany and Britain, and although the British Navy and the government did not accept the idea of a 35% ratio between the two navies. However, the offer was acceptable, as Germany had no colonies to defend and was not threatened with attack from any country. This led to Britain's serious thinking with the signing of the British-German Maritime Agreement. <sup>(16)</sup>

Britain sincerely believed that there were real injustices on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, and that the German sense of injustice had contributed to the emergence of the Nazi movement, British diplomacy had faced the need to deal with a rising Germany determined to free itself from Versailles restrictions while France was internally divided but nevertheless strongly opposed any changes. The British considered that nothing could be done to prevent some German rearming and that the French refusal to come to terms with this reality was futile. <sup>(17)</sup>

Although British policymakers recognized the need to improve Britain's defence posture and somehow deal with German rearming, by 1935 they had not pursued a coordinated strategy. In particular, there was the Central Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that dealt with German affairs, and they favored a policy of resolute resistance to any German moves towards a unilateral review of Versailles. On the other hand, there were officials more directly interested in military matters, who considered that financial and military imperatives required some way to reach some kind of understanding with the Germans. <sup>(18)</sup>

Hitler was interested in the idea of the British-German alliance. However, he was determined to improve the capabilities of the German Navy along with the expansion of his army and air force, he delegated Admiral Eric Ryder (Eric Rider), head of the German Naval Command, has moved forward with plans that would provide maritime superiority in the Baltic Sea and this has caused serious concern for France, which has had to split its fleet between the Atlantic and Mediterranean Ocean. <sup>(19)</sup>

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<sup>(14)</sup> Quoted in: Eckkercher, B. J. C. Transition of power: Britain's loss of global pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945. Publisher Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press.1972.p.48

<sup>(15)</sup> McDonough, Frank. Neville Chamberlain, appeasement, and the British road to war. Publisher. Manchester ; New York : Manchester University Press ; New York : Distributed exclusively in the USA by St. Martin's Press.1998.pp.219-220

<sup>(16)</sup> *ibid.*p.222

<sup>(17)</sup> M. L. Alch, Germany's naval resurgence, British appeasement and the anglo -German naval agreement 1935, Los Angeles, CA, 1977).p 191.

<sup>(18)</sup> W. K. Wark, The ultimate enemy: British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (London, 1985).p 89.

<sup>(19)</sup> J. Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935-1939 (Boppard am Rhein, 1973).p 291.

Hitler and the German Navy were already planning a final war against Britain in 1933-1935. However, Hitler was planning a radical change in the European balance of naval power in a way that would harm the French and British. <sup>(20)</sup> For years, the German Navy participated in the construction of submarines abroad despite a ban in the Treaty of Versailles on Germany's possession of submarine power. In April 1935, Hitler authorized the Navy to begin construction of twelve submarines weighing 250 tons and this news was eventually transmitted to the British Government; However, despite the violation of the Treaty of Versailles, neither the British Ambassador to Berlin nor the Foreign Minister formally protested, as the British side realized that Germany could of course continue its shipbuilding efforts without British consent. <sup>(21)</sup>

A preventive war restoring Germany to the Versailles law was not possible, however, the resolute British opposition could have created major diplomatic difficulties for Hitler and could have jeopardized his objectives, which at this stage spurred Hitler's decision to try to reach a maritime agreement with Britain. <sup>(22)</sup> Hitler aspired to have a naval force of about 35% of the size of the British Navy before becoming an adviser. However, there is no official evidence of this figure, but Hitler first mentioned Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps' 35% (Eric Phipps) in a conversation in December 1934, Phipps had complained about German rearming, and on a subsequent visit to Berlin by Lord Lothian <sup>(23)</sup> s sovereignty at sea <sup>(24)</sup>". British Foreign Affairs proposed its Foreign Minister's visit to Germany <sup>(25)</sup>, and the visit was later arranged in March 1935 despite Hitler's announcement on 16 March 1935 of his intention to resume recruitment and expand the army

Both in violation of Versailles), Simon and his deputy Anthony Eden visited Germany. The British wanted to find some means to achieve a general disarmament arrangement accepted by Germany. Which was inconclusive, Hitler once again put forward his offer to the maritime arrangement at the time, telling Simon Hitler that his desire to build a fleet equivalent to 35% of the British fleet would look very large to the British government, making the General Agreement almost impossible. Hitler pointed out in response to Simon's statement that the German Government wished to avoid this thing. <sup>(26)</sup>

In his talks with Hitler in March 1935, Simon proposed detailed talks between the two countries' naval crew in London. It was hoped that such talks would lay the groundwork for Germany's introduction into a universal treaty system and the offer was accepted by Hitler. and after some confusion in schedules, a German delegation was arranged to arrive in London for talks in late May 1935 and regardless of the likelihood of Germans repeating the 35 per cent formula The initial points proposed by Britain to make with the Germans were:

1. Germany's support for a general international convention to deal with qualitative constraints.

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<sup>(20)</sup> G. C. Peden, 'Sir Warren Fisher and British rearmament against Germany', *English Historical Review*, vol. 94, (1979) pp. 29-30.

<sup>(21)</sup> M. Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935-1945*, (Frankfurt, 1970), p 200.

<sup>(22)</sup> G. Schmidt, *The politics and economics of appeasement: British foreign policy* (Hamburg, 1981), p 195.

<sup>(23)</sup> Lord Lothian 1882-1940: British statesman, served (1905-10) on various government committees in South Africa and was a member of "Kindergarten After Returning to England, Edited his Round-Table Journal (1910-1916), a liberal scientific journal he helped to establish, such as David Lloyd, Private Secretary of George (1916-1921). He inherited his title in 1930, represented the Liberal Party in the National Government as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1931-1932) and served as Chairman of the Indian Privilege Commission (1932). Lothian called for the appeasement of Nazi Germany until 1939 when he approached the strong call to resist Adolf Hitler was a supporter of close British-American cooperation, secretary of the Rhodes Fund after 1925, and was appointed ambassador to Washington in 1939.

For more views:

Encyclopaedia. Com.

<sup>(24)</sup> G. L. Weinberg, *The foreign policy of Hitler's Germany: diplomatic revolution in Europe, 1933-1936* Chicago, IL, and London, 1970) p 131.

<sup>(25)</sup> O.24/254. NOTES OF ANGLO-GERMAN CONVERSATIONS, HELD AT THE CHANCELLOR'S PALACE, BERLIN, ON MARCH 25 AND 26, 1935.

<sup>(26)</sup> G. L. Weinberg, *Starting World War II, 1937-1939*, London, 1980). P 148.

2. Abolition in any future maritime treaty that raises maritime power ratios between signatories.
3. Negotiate an understanding on the form and content of each State's declarations to indicate future construction programmes.
4. The creation of a clause in the new treaty recognizing the equality of each signatory State's national status, regardless of the size of its navy. <sup>(27)</sup>

The German delegation to the talks arrived in London, headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop. Talks began in June with the usual opening statements, followed by Simon's explanation that everything his government wanted was an exchange of information and that any formal agreement must await the outcome of future negotiations on the maritime treaty. <sup>(28)</sup>

Ribbentrop ignored the Foreign Secretary's remarks and demanded that Britain conclude a formal agreement with Germany on Hitler's proposal to build a fleet of up to 35% of British power. The British side rejected this offer, but Ribbentrop insisted on reaching an agreement, and said that this ratio was final and not subject to change or negotiation. Moreover, no bargaining can be accepted on this point, several other meetings followed, but Ribbentrop was adamant that the ratio should be accepted or rejected the next day, and Ribbentrop interrupted the British meeting to confirm his view: "It did not take long for the British to make their decisions. The actual decision was taken on 5 June to approve German applications, and there was unanimous consent between the British Government and the Foreign Office in favour of acceptance. Eden had reservations, a potential strain this would cause to the relationship with France. <sup>(29)</sup>

Interest in the agreement was routine and almost total accreditation was pre-established. Simon Ribbentrop informed a day before the agreement was signed that the British government had agreed to recognize the Reich President's decision (Hitler) as the basis for future maritime discussions between the British and German governments, and to agree to a permanent relationship between the two fleets of 35% for the Germans, and 100% for the British Fleet. <sup>(30)</sup>

Britain officially accepted the offer on 6 June, but the official signature and publication of the agreement was postponed by a week to enable Britain to consult with other maritime powers about its items. The German side was informed that consultations with other countries would not affect or affect the institutes. The agreement stipulated that 35%

It will be taken on a category basis, that is, Germany will build up to 35% of the load of British battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc., and construction over 35% must be in one category at the expense of another <sup>(31)</sup>

In the second phase of the negotiations, which began on June 15, 1935, the Germans made an additional request that the 35% arrangement did not include submarines in the category in which they intended to seek parity with the Royal Navy. The British had to accept this despite a compromise where the German Navy could build up to 45% of the British naval force. If Germany wished to exceed this figure, it would have to give notice, and this aspect would be amicably discussed between the two Governments. <sup>(32)</sup>

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<sup>(27)</sup> G. L. Weinberg, *op.cit*, p.150.

<sup>(28)</sup> D. C. Watt. *The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment.* *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 28, No. 2 published by Francis and Taylor, New York. (Jun., 1956), pp. 155-156

<sup>(29)</sup> F. S. Northedge, *the League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986), p. 134.

<sup>(30)</sup> W. K. Wark, *op.cit*, p.90.

<sup>(31)</sup> G. L. Weinberg, *op.cit*, p.140.

<sup>(32)</sup> reland, Bernard. *War at sea, 1914-45.* Publisher. London . Cassell press.2002.p.198

The British tried to amend the agreement at the last minute, adding a section to the other permanent and binding treaty document to an interim plan for future negotiations. This was the first item discussed when negotiations resumed on 17 June, and the British side explained that this section had been added to calm the French, leading the Germans to agree that general arms restrictions would be facilitated through this Convention, but that the treaty must be permanent and binding. <sup>(33)</sup>

The British-German Maritime Convention was concluded on 18 June 1935 in London in the form of an exchange of notes between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Samuel Hoare <sup>(34)</sup>, and the representative of the Third Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop. In this agreement, the British government accepted Germany's right to expand its naval forces to 35% of Britain's naval forces, and from a military standpoint, this meant that the global payload of the German Navy could be increased fourfold (from the level of 108,000 tons granted to Germany in the Treaty of Versailles to 420,500 tons). From a formal and legal point of view, the agreement meant the review of the Treaty of Versailles and the legitimization by Britain of Adolf Hitler's condemnation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles in March 1935. Politically, the Convention highlighted British politics' tendency to seek agreement with Berlin through a review of the Versailles regime. It also meant breaking the joint British-French-Italian front towards Germany and abandoning the policy of assuming that Western powers would agree to review the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in exchange for certain concessions from Hitler (Germany's return to the League of Nations and the Conference on Disarmament and Germany's accession to regional security conventions - the Air Alliance, the Eastern Charter and the DanCharter). <sup>(35)</sup>.

The German and British governments exchanged observations on June 18, 1935, signing the Convention as required by the exchange of diplomatic notes by Ribbentrop and Hor, thus making the British-German maritime agreement a reality, with a declaration made to the world the following day. It was not long before the British Government felt the first shockwaves of reaction to its volatile diplomacy that all of Europe was shocked by the surprise of the event that led to a permanent treaty. <sup>(36)</sup> Under the British-German Agreement, the latter was allowed to build a fleet of 3 German aircraft and 6 light cruisers, 12 torpedo boats, and the Germans were allowed to reach 35% of the world's greatest naval force. The new treaty also allowed them (5) boats, (5) heavy cruisers, (11) light cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and (64) destroyed with higher increases than this total when Britain increased its fleet, and the Marines were again allowed up to 45% of British soldiers and the size of the warship was set at (35,000) tons. 10 days after the signing of the treaty, the new U-1 submarine was operated in Kiel. The mysterious high-security barns built in 1934 were opened to detect Germany's first new submarines. In 1935, eleven other small submarines were in service; the first submarine fleet - consisting of three 250-ton coastal ships named the Wedgin Fleet, named after a 1914 submarine hero - was placed under Captain Carl Donitz on 28 September 1935. Germany started building 24 small submarines. <sup>(37)</sup>

<sup>(33)</sup> M. L. Alch, *Germany's naval resurgence, British appeasement and the anglo -German naval agreement 1935*, Los Angeles, CA, 1977).p 191.

<sup>(34)</sup> Samuel Hoare, British politician and diplomat, 1880-1959) Conservative MP, Secretary of State for India, 1931, 1935, Stanley Baldwin offered Hoare to choose between the position of Deputy King of India or Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and he chose the latter position as his desire to become future Prime Minister, Hoare assumed his Ministry of Interior 1937-1939, and the British Ambassador to Spain from 1940 to 1944. For More Look Randolph Spencer.Winston S. Churchill. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.1966.p.9

<sup>(35)</sup> . Diillffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Rekhspolitik und Flottenbau, , Dusseldorf, 1973).p 101.

<sup>(36)</sup> D. C. WaAll.op.cit.p.160

<sup>(37)</sup> Allan Nevins.The Anglo-German Naval Pact.Current History (1916-1940), Vol. 42, No. 5 (AUGUST 1935), New York. pp.506-507

## CONCLUSION

- 1) The Anglo-German maritime agreement was an ambitious attempt by both the British and the Germans to reach better relations, but was ultimately hampered by different expectations between the two countries.
- 2) The Maritime Convention has often been criticized for damaging Britain, France and Italy's efforts. to form a common front against Hitler's unilateral rejection of the Versailles settlement
- 3) The British-German maritime agreement strained relations between Britain and France at a time when British-French unity against Germany was necessary.
- 4) The Convention was part of an intense but ultimately futile effort to control naval weapons in the years between the two world wars, and at the same time was an important first step in Britain's policy towards Nazi Germany, which became known as the policy of appeasement.

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