



## RESEARCH ARTICLE

## Political Developments of the Baghdad Province During the Era of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey (5/1/1915 - 6/7/1915)

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
<p>Received: Apr 24, 2024</p> <p>Accepted: Jul 5, 2024</p> <hr/> <p><b>Keywords</b></p> <p>The Ottomans</p> <p>Baghdad</p> <p>Suleiman Nazif Bey</p> <hr/> <p><b>*Corresponding Author:</b></p> <p>shakerhussein@utq.edu.iq</p>	<p>This research deals with the political developments in the Baghdad Province during the reign of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey (5/1/1915 - 6/7/1915). The Baghdad Province gained special importance due to its political status and its distinguished geographical location with the authorities of the Sublime Porte. This topic was divided into an introduction and three main axes that dealt with the political developments of the state of Baghdad during the reign of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey during the period (5/1/1915 - 6/7/1915) and a conclusion. The research relied on a large number of sources, including Ottoman archive documents (not published) which contributed to giving important details about the policy of this governor in the state of Baghdad, and also relied on a number of Arab and foreign university theses and dissertations, Arabic and Arabized books, and Arab and foreign research that provided the research with valuable information.</p>

### INTRODUCTION

This research deals with the political developments in the Baghdad Province during the reign of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey (5/1/1915 - 6/7/1915). The Baghdad Province gained special importance due to its political status and its distinguished geographical location among the authorities of the Sublime Porte, and it is one of the important religious cities in the world. The Islamic State, as it was the center of the Islamic Caliphate and its fall undermined the attitude of the Ottoman state and its responsibility in defending the most important Arab Islamic monuments, and because of the circumstances to which the Ottoman state was exposed and the awkwardness of its military attitude, the weakness of which appeared after the military attacks of the British forces in which they demonstrated superiority in organization and equipment, and it was This is clear through the achievement of successive victories, as well as the fall of large parts of the Basra Province, which has an important strategic location for the Ottoman state. As a result, the higher Ottoman authorities in Istanbul began searching for an administrative figure with experience in changing things in favor of the Ottoman state and through her knowledge of the conditions of Iraq and its relationship. Kindness to various segments of society, so the Sublime Porte's attention was focused on choosing Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey in this difficult circumstance and in this sensitive place. What distinguishes Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey is his administrative professionalism, integrity, and

political acumen. He was also described by his justice among his subjects and his combination of Ottomanism and Islam. And his patriotic sense, which appeared clearly through his literary activities and his defense of the entity of the Ottoman state and ensuring its unity. The deteriorating conditions during the rule of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey were very difficult in all its aspects, given the chaos that pervaded all Iraqi cities, including the state of Baghdad. However, the size of the tasks The responsibility of which was entrusted to Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey during this difficult period was not a surprise to Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey due to his strength of personality and his ability to handle the matter. The Ottoman state , through his appointment, wanted to restore matters in its favor by reorganizing its forces to confront the British occupation.

This topic was divided into an introduction and three main axes that dealt with the political developments of the state of Baghdad during the reign of the governor Suleiman Nazif Bey during the period (5/1/1915 - 6/7/1915) and a conclusion. The research relied on a large number of sources, including Ottoman archive documents (unpublished). ) which contributed to giving important details about the policy of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey in and from Baghdad Province : **Bâbiâlî Evrak Odası (BEO) · Dahiliye Nezareti Dahiliye Kalem-i Mahsus Evrakı (DH.KMS), Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Evrakı(DH. ŞFR), Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Yedinci Şube ( DH.EUM.7. Şb) Dâhiliye Nezâreti İdâre-i Umumiyye Ekleri( DH.I. UM. EK) Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları (MV) , I-Meclis I-İrâde Mahsûs (I. MMS) .**

As well as a number of Arab and foreign university theses and dissertations, Arabic and Arabized books, and Arab and foreign research that provided the research with valuable information.

### **Political Developments of the Baghdad Province During the Era of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey (5/1/1915 - 6/7/1915):**

#### **The first axis: The Entry of the Ottoman State into World War I in 1914:**

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed many conflicts and political alliances between European countries, which crystallized and expanded the arena of conflicts between them, which in turn was divided into two camps. The first camp consisted of Britain, France, Russia, and their allies, which was historically known as the Entente Cordiale (Allies). As for the second camp, it consists of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and their allies, which is known as the <sup>(1)</sup> (Central) countries. Given the intensity of these conflicts that the region witnessed and its proximity to the Ottoman state , it was not able to maintain a attitude of neutrality for a long time, and this was the main motive for the Ottoman state entering the war. In addition to Germany's fear of Russian expansion towards the south and its attempt to control the Dardanelles corridor, Russia's ambitions were not recent, but rather go back to 1909 when it concluded an alliance with Italy, as the Russians gave Italy a free hand in occupying Tripoli to the west in exchange for its commitment, which was not to interfere if it wanted. The Russians occupy the Dardanelles<sup>(2)</sup>. The Ottoman state entered into a secret treaty with Germany on August 2, 1914, and in mid-October the Ottoman state entered the war on the side of Germany <sup>(3)</sup> , and in early November 1914, Russia declared war on the Ottoman state , and Britain and France followed suit on November 5, 1914<sup>(4)</sup> .

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(1)Zainab Abdel Muttalib Taher, the policies of major powers in the late nineteenth century and their impact on creating an atmosphere of war, Journal of the College of Basic Education, Volume (21), Issue (88), 2005, P. 496.

(2)Sayyar Al-Jamil, Memoirs of Hussein Qadri 1892-1986, Amman, 2018, P. 89.

(3) Ibid., P.90.

(4)Hisham Sawadi Hashem and Ahmed Mahmoud Alo Al-Samarrai, The Development of the Political Conditions in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918, Al-Farahidi Adab Magazine, Issue (24), January 2016, P. 350.

## **The second axis: The Importance of Iraq to British Policy:**

Iraq has gained great importance in British policy since the beginning of British activity in the Arabian Gulf in the early nineteenth century. The idea of Britain's occupation of Iraq was not the result of World War I, but rather had distant roots extending to the late nineteenth century, and it continued to have political and strategic importance for Britain, especially the southern part of it, which is considered an entrance to the northern Arabian Gulf, as Britain sought to establish a security barrier to protect its interests in India, and this importance was confirmed by the statements made by senior British politicians. Lord Curzon stated in the year 1892 that Baghdad is located within the ports of The Arabian Gulf must fall within British sovereignty, and British interests in Iraq varied, including economic and political interests and their consequences <sup>(5)</sup>. We will explain it as follows:

### **1- Economic and Political Interests:**

The nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the development of British economic interests in Iraq to a great extent, until the British took a decisive role in directing the economies of Iraq. The British considered Iraq an important source of economic resources and raw materials that fuel its industries. The importance of Iraq also emerged as an important market for the sale of its industrial goods<sup>(6)</sup>. They took control of its foreign trade and transportation network and used Iraq as a market to supply the British industry with raw materials. In addition, the discovery of oil sources in Persia in 1908, and since these sources are linked by a single geological structure with Iraq, the oil belt of Persia's fields extends to Iraq<sup>(7)</sup>. Lord Curzon also declared in 1911 in the House of Lords that it is a mistake to believe that British interests are limited to the Arabian Gulf region, and are not limited to the region extending between Basra and Baghdad, but rather extend beyond Baghdad to the north, and the plan to occupy (Al-Faw) It had been developed since 1912, but the British government in India did not agree to this plan at the time<sup>(8)</sup>.

As for Iraq's strategic importance to British policy, it is represented by its distinctive geographical location on the Arabian Gulf, as it has become an important land route for crossing between East Asia and India, and it is part of the vital land route to India for the communications of the British Empire <sup>(9)</sup>. As a result, Britain sought, through its diplomatic missions, to prevent the incursion of any foreign country into southern Iraq and the Arabian Gulf region. Britain was also aware of the extent of international competition that was trying to impose its influence and control over this important region, and it received its information through its intelligence missions, especially from those who were on the one hand, they roamed the regions of Iraq as travelers or archaeologists, and on the other hand, the British-German competition was based on imposing hegemony and influence over this region, and when Germany succeeded in contracting with the Ottoman state to extend the Baghdad-Berlin railway line and then to the city of Basra, it raised The anger of Britain, which began seeking by all means to disrupt this project, succeeded in signing an agreement with Germany obligating it to end the Baghdad-Berlin line to the city of Basra and not to go beyond it to Kuwait City and the Arabian Gulf except with the approval of Britain. With this agreement, Britain was able to guarantee its

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<sup>(5)</sup>Rakhawi Radia and Shaoun Muhammad Farouq, *The Anglo-German rivalry in Iraq 1871-1918*, Master's thesis, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Djilali Bounaama University, 2016/2017, P. 28.

<sup>(6)</sup>Muhammad Hamdi al-Jaafari, *Britain and Iraq, an era of conflict 1914-1918*, Baghdad, 2000, P. 14.

<sup>(7)</sup>Saleh Khadr Muhammad al-Dulaimi, *British Strategic Interests in Iraq 1800-1914*, research published in the book *Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Mufassal fi Contemporary Iraq*, Baghdad, 2002, P. 19.

<sup>(8)</sup>Farouk Saleh Al-Omar, *on Britain's policy in Iraq 1913-1921*, Baghdad, 1977, P. 6.

<sup>(9)</sup>Jaafar Abbas Hamidi, *Contemporary History of Iraq 1914-1968*, Baghdad, 2015, P. 14.

interests by not Violating it, especially in southern Iraq<sup>(10)</sup>. After the Ottoman coup in 1908, the Unionists began to approach Britain by seeking the help of some British experts, especially the famous irrigation engineer Sir William Willcox <sup>(11)</sup>, who surveyed the old irrigation projects in Iraq and presented a modern study on them, and his mission lasted two years. Through it, Britain was able to study Iraq from its various natural aspects. This mission was considered one of the basic steps in which Britain strengthened its influence in Iraq before the outbreak of World War I. Before the war, Britain also obtained the privilege of lighting the Shatt al-Arab and the Arabian Gulf and regulating maritime navigation after the Sultan's approval. The Ottoman state in 1914<sup>(12)</sup>.

## 2- Reasons for the British occupation of Iraq:

A- Britain's desire to protect the oil establishments in Mohammerah from Ottoman attacks after they announced entry into the war on the side of Germany. This will deprive Britain of the most important fuel resource.

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<sup>(10)</sup>Muhammad Hamdi Al-Jaafari , Op.Cit., P. 15.

<sup>(11)</sup>William Wilcox: He was born in India in 1852. He completed his eleven-year studies in the practice of irrigation engineering, through which he gained experience and confidence in scientific circles. The Ottoman Empire chose him to work in the capital as a technical advisor to introduce modern methods in irrigation affairs. It also sent him to Egypt. The design of the Aswan reservoir was developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, which witnessed great interest in addressing irrigation problems in Iraq, as Iraq was suffering due to the nature of its land from the flooding of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their appendages, which had a serious impact on irrigation, and the nature of Iraq's land, which began to gradually flatten and level out as we headed from the north. To the south, where the slope decreases, the land is flat, and the river's course expands, therefore, central and southern Iraq, starting from the north of Baghdad (Tikrit on the Tigris and Hit on the Euphrates) to the Shatt al-Arab, are exposed to the danger of flooding, which destroys crops and crops in some years, overwhelming the two banks and covering large areas of agricultural land. With the intensification of the British-German competition over Iraq, the famous British irrigation engineer Sir William Wilcox presented a study on how to control the rivers of Iraq since 1902. He collected a summary of his preliminary studies, which he presented as a public lecture before the Khedival Geographical Society in Cairo in March 1903 under the title ( Renewal of Iraq), and in 1904-1905 he conducted a field study of Iraq and presented a comprehensive study on the problem of irrigation in Iraq to Sultan Abdul Hamid II through the British ambassador in Istanbul. The British ambassador's intervention in the matter was part of the British expansion plan in Iraq and the region, and the issue remained frozen until The Ottoman coup took place in 1908, and during the constitutional era, interest began to increase in Mesopotamia, especially when the Ottoman government adopted the irrigation projects presented by William Wilcox, which were officially announced in October 1908. After his visit to Iraq, he estimated the agricultural areas that could be reclaimed through... These projects were divided into ten major projects, including the construction of a number of dams, such as the construction of the Hindiyah Dam, the Habbaniyah Lake Project, and the Kut Dam, and the opening of a number of secondary rivers with approximately (13) million acres. He concluded his study with the expenses necessary to carry out these projects with (16,900,000) million pounds sterling, and he presented his report. Final in April 1911, he died in 1932. See: Faisal Muhammad al-Arhaim , *The Development of Iraq Under Federalist Rule (1908-1914)*, Mosul, 1975, PP. 159-160; Khaled Al-Saadoun, *Papers on the History of the Arabian Gulf*, Beirut, 2011, PP. 290-291; Yassin Shihab Shukri, *Baghdad Province 1872-1909, a study of its administrative and economic conditions*, Master's thesis, College of Arts, University of Mosul, 1994, P. 114.

<sup>(12)</sup>Muhammad Hamdi al-Jaafari, Op.Cit., P. 15.

B- Fear of the Ottoman government's attacks on British and Indian nationals residing in Basra.

C - Britain's protection of the sheikhs of Kuwait and Muhammarah from Ottoman attacks and the possibility of tempting them to side with it.

D- Britain is also trying to show its attitude towards the Arabs, protect them, and rid them of Ottoman control.

E - Transforming Iraq into a market for products, a site for investing British capital, and a supplier of agricultural and mineral raw materials<sup>(13)</sup>.

### 3- Military operations:

The Ottoman state maintained its neutrality for three months, after which it announced its entry into the war alongside Germany in mid-October 1914. On the second day of November, Russia declared war on the Ottoman state, followed by France and Britain on November 5, 1914<sup>(14)</sup>.

Orders were issued by the British government to its forces stationed in the Arabian Gulf to head towards Al-Faw. Sir Percy Cox (1864-1937) <sup>(15)</sup>, the political officer accompanying the British campaign, issued a statement in which he explained, **"His government was forced to go to war due to the anti-Ottoman attitude, as Britain sent its forces To protect its trade and friends, and to evacuate the Ottoman Turks from the region, and to have no hostility with the Arabs"** <sup>(16)</sup>.

The British forces landed in Al-Faw in the late hours of the sixth of November 1914 and raised the British flag over them after weak resistance from the Ottoman forces, which were forced to withdraw. After that, the British forces were able to control the entrances to the Shatt Al-Arab. The Ottoman leadership was not aware of the occupation of Al-Faw due to the interruption of Telegraphic communication lines with Basra, and the news arrived through fleeing employees <sup>(17)</sup>, Then the British forces headed towards the city of Basra and, after unequal battles, were able to control the city of Basra on November 22, 1914<sup>(18)</sup>.

After settling down and establishing housing for its forces, the British forces pursued some of the Ottoman forces withdrawing towards Qurna and Zubair. The British forces did not stop after occupying the city of Basra, as they headed on December 3 to occupy the city of Qurna, and after weak battles with the Ottoman forces, the British forces were able to control it on the 9<sup>th</sup>. December 1914, after the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces towards Amara. The importance of Qurna lies in controlling the Shatt al-Arab stream, which helps the passage of large ships, in addition to its military

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<sup>(13)</sup>Enas Saadi Abdullah, *Modern History of Iraq 1258-1918*, Baghdad, 2014, P. 584.

<sup>(14)</sup>Ibid.,P.586.

<sup>(15)</sup>Percy Cox: Percy Zachariah Cox was born on November 20, 1864, in the city of Herongate, located in the southeastern part of England. He joined the army in 1884, after completing his studies in the city of Herongate, and he also worked in the political department. In India in 1890, he worked as High Commissioner in the Arabian Gulf region from 1894 until 1914. After the declaration of World War I and Britain's entry into Iraq, he was appointed High Commissioner to Iraq and accompanying the British campaign. See: Abbas Khudair Abbas, *Percy Cox and his role in British policy in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula 1899-1915*, Master's thesis, College of Education, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2009.

<sup>(16)</sup>Jaafar Abbas Hamidi, *Op.Cit.*, P. 16.

<sup>(17)</sup>Karim Ajeel Faleh Al-Musawi, *Kut in the Late Ottoman Era (1869-1917)*, Master's Thesis, College of Education, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2009, P. 145.

<sup>(18)</sup>Muhammad Suhail Taqoush, *Modern and Contemporary History of Iraq*, Beirut, 2015, P. 114.

location at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The region also provides the British forces' food requirements as it is a rich agricultural area. As well as the moral impact on the tribes<sup>(19)</sup>.

The British military plans and supplies were based on accurate calculations and good estimates from the beginning of their advance towards the Arabian Gulf region. As a result of these preparations, the British forces were able to achieve major and rapid victories and advance to impose their control over several regions<sup>(20)</sup>.

### **The third axis: The efforts of the government of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey to confront the British occupation of Iraq:**

#### **1- Changing the administrative and military leadership:**

Following the fall of the city of Basra and Qurna, orders arrived in Istanbul requiring the removal of Javid Pasha from his attitude. The Central Command held Javid Pasha responsible for the defeats suffered by its military forces in the battles they fought with the British forces in Basra and Qurna, and the Central Command wanted to disavow its responsibility for that. Its readiness was not at the required level of equipment and organization, and the governor, Javid Pasha, who held the attitude of military and administrative leadership of the state of Baghdad <sup>(21)</sup>, was assigned the responsibility of commanding the Sixth Corps to some of the governors of Baghdad in addition to their administrative function, but the Ottoman state stopped assigning this task a year ago. 1877 during the era of the state of Abdul Rahman Pasha, after the governor's attempt to secede from the state of Baghdad. The central leadership expressed its fears regarding this procedure of carrying out a separatist or disobedient movement by combining the two attitudes with one person. The government also separated the military leadership from the state and appointed an independent commander, and this procedure It is also not without negatives and often creates a kind of grudge and conflict between the governor and the commander of the Sixth Corps<sup>(22)</sup>. During the era of the federal government, the command of the Sixth Corps was restored to the disposal of the governor after the appointment of Nazim Pasha as governor of Baghdad (1910-1911). The text of his decree stated: **"One of my honorable first legions and a member of the Military Shura, to whose charge I directed my benevolence, the governorship of Baghdad and the leadership of the Sixth Corps, Al-Hamayouni, Nazim Pasha, may his glory last."** <sup>(23)</sup> Based on our desire to advance the development of the aforementioned state, increase its wealth, expand its trade, coordinate and reform our Sixth Corps, and obtain complementary reasons, our will necessitated linking the two functions to one another and referring them to the same person who has experienced phases. Then the two functions were separated after the dismissal of Governor Nazim Pasha, and during the reign of Governor Javaid Pasha in early 1914, the two functions were merged again. While during the reign of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, who assumed his administrative attitude in January 1915, the army leadership was separated from the state attitude, and Commander Suleiman Askari <sup>(24)</sup> was appointed

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<sup>(19)</sup>Shukri Mahmoud Nadim, *The Iraq War 1914-1918*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Baghdad, 1964, P. 26.

<sup>(20)</sup>Enas Saadi Abdullah, *Op.Cit.*, P. 587.

<sup>(21)</sup>Ali Al-Wardi, *Social Glances from the Modern History of Iraq*, Vol. 4, Baghdad, 1974, P. 135.

<sup>(22)</sup>Jamil Musa Al-Najjar, *The Ottoman Administration in the Baghdad Province during the Era of Governor Midhat Pasha until the End of the Ottoman Rule 1869-1917*, Cairo, 1991, P. 180.

<sup>(23)</sup>Abbas Al-Azzawi, *The History of Iraq between Two Occupations*, vol. 8, Baghdad, 1956, PP. 226-227.

<sup>(24)</sup>Suleiman Askari: The Minister of War, Anwar Pasha, appointed Suleiman Askari, who fought with him against the Italians, as head of the military command in Iraq, as he was one of the military leaders who served in Iraq and had knowledge of its general conditions, and when the war broke out, he was in Istanbul to be consulted by the high command on matters of war. See: Mehmet

to lead the army, then it was merged during the era of Governor Nour al-Din Pasha <sup>(25)</sup>, who succeeded Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey in July of the year 1915<sup>(26)</sup>.

Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey sent an encrypted telegram to the Interior Council <sup>(27)</sup>. In May 1915, the Interior Council responded when it sent a telegram to Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey that invalidated the use of the third type of encryption used in communication between the state center and the Sublime Porte <sup>(28)</sup> after Britain declared war. Against the Ottoman state, in which he explained what should be done by the authorities of the Sublime Porte by exploiting their religious influence and our power among the Islamic world, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey wanted to encourage the Islamic community and moral influence by declaring jihad. As he mentioned in his telegram, coordination must be made with the mujtahids and religious scholars in Najaf and Karbala and appropriate plans should be made in order to unify the ranks and strike a blow at the enemy. As Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey explained in his telegram that Britain wants The fall and collapse of the Ottoman state, and it is working on this through its allies. He also explained that Germany, the ally of the Ottoman state, was urging the need for the Ottoman state to exploit its power through Islam in order to confront the Allied countries and their interests in the provinces of the Ottoman state. The telegram sent from Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey also included the places of movement. The Ottoman forces on the Iraq front, and at the end of his telegram, the governor stressed the necessity of exploiting the religious factor in mobilizing the forces and mujahideen against the enemy <sup>(29)</sup>.

On January 23, 1915, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey addressed the Sublime Porte specifically to the pen of the Interior Ministry's 7th Division with the necessity of sending Shawkat Bey and allowing him to go to Isfahan to urge the people and their effective participation in the greater jihad in Persia, and the tribes that announced their involvement in participation They must be exploited, encouraged, and stimulated, and to increase their effectiveness and participation in jihad<sup>(30)</sup>. After the announcement of the jihad movement in Iraq, it had a wide resonance in Arabistan, as most of the Arab tribes there were enthusiastic about it, and there were several reasons behind this, including that those tribes hated Sheikh Khazal and his harsh treatment in collecting taxes, so they seized the opportunity of jihad to take revenge on him, as well as the great role played by He was played by Sayid Issa Kamal al-Din <sup>(31)</sup>, the chief scholar of Arabistan at that time, and he began wandering among

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Gündüz, Kuşatılan Bir Ülkenin Kuşatan Ordusu: İspanya Basınına Göre Kûtü'l-Amâre Zaferi, CTAD, Yıl 18, Sayı 36 (Güz 2022), S. 673.

<sup>(25)</sup>Nour al-Din Pasha: The son of Field Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, the governor and commander of Western Tripoli. He was born in the city of Bursa in 1874. He entered the military school and graduated with the rank of second lieutenant. Then he entered the First Corps department in 1895. He was an experienced commander with a high military culture, strict and extremely cruel. Upon his arrival as governor of Baghdad, he took several measures, including closing the newspapers that were published in the city of Baghdad and exiling their owners under the pretext of their indifference to current events and not taking stances in support of the Ottoman Empire. He also took harsh measures against the Jews and Christians. See: Karim Ajeel Faleh Al-Musawi, Op.Cit., p. 150; Ali Al-Wardi, Op.Cit., Vol. 4, P. 157.

<sup>(26)</sup>Jamil Musa Al-Najjar, Op.Cit., P. 181.

<sup>(27)</sup>Coded telegrams, which are telegrams written with special codes whose content cannot be read and known. The Ottoman Empire used this method in communications between its states and governmental institutions for fear of them falling into the hands of the occupation.

<sup>(28)</sup>BOA, DH. KMS., Nr. 24-2-22/25, 29 Tarih : 20 Cemaziyelâhir 1333 (4 May 1915).

<sup>(29)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 459- 34 / 1, Tarih :13 Kasım 1330 R ( 27 November 1914).

<sup>(30)</sup>BOA, DH. EUM.7. Şb., Nr. 3-10 /2 , Tarih : 8 Rebûlevvel 1333 ( 23 January 1915).

<sup>(31)</sup>Issa Kamal al-Din: Mr. Issa Kamal al-Din was born in the city of Hilla in 1877, and when he grew up, he went to the holy city of Najaf for the purpose of seeking knowledge and jurisprudence at

the regions of Arabistan and its tribes, urging them to join and respond to the call of the Jihad Movement <sup>(32)</sup>.

## 2- Declaring jihad:

Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey continued the process of recruiting citizens, providing material and moral support, equipping them with military equipment, and transporting them to the battlefields, especially after Britain and its allies declared war on the Ottoman state on October 29, 1914, and thus Britain and its allies began directing their military campaigns in order to control the Islamic countries. Including Iraq, Britain realized the difficulty of its success in Iraq, which was afraid of popular attitudes rejecting foreign control, especially the Shiite scholars whose attitudes began to become clear after some Islamic regions were exposed to foreign colonialism in 1911 when Tripoli in the West was exposed to Italian colonialism and their response to any attempt targeting the political entity of Muslims <sup>(33)</sup>. Therefore, their emphasis was on the necessity of their support for the Ottoman state in order to preserve the foundation of Islam, and despite the oscillating relationship between the two parties, their attitudes were based on their diagnosis that the Ottoman state, despite its lack of legitimacy to rule, represented the Islamic framework that unites the Islamic peoples, and he declared Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey said that the Islamic Unity League represented by the Ottoman state constitutes a force for Islam, and therefore it must be supported to prevent colonial expansion that seeks to impose its control on the regions of the Islamic world and its attempt to control its will and social values and exploit its wealth <sup>(34)</sup>. Britain's fears were confirmed by the British ambassador in Istanbul when He expressed in his letter to his Foreign Minister Edward Gray on September 25, 1914, in which he stated that the British Deputy Consul in the Holy Cities did not influence the diligent scholars, change their convictions, and bring them to our side, and that his endeavor did not affect the attitude of the seminary in the slightest <sup>(35)</sup>.

On November 7, 1914, the Ottoman state began a broad religious campaign to gain the support of Muslim scholars in all the Ottoman provinces. On the same day, Sheikh al-Islam Khairy Effendi issued a fatwa declaring jihad against the infidels, after the defeats that the Ottoman forces suffered in the battles of Basra and their withdrawal to Amara and Shuaiba. The Ottoman military leadership worked to reconsider its military plans and organization of its forces in the country. They also worked to gain the Iraqis' support for them by declaring "**holy jihad**", which had an impact in directing public opinion influenced by religious sentiments to take up arms against the British forces. They began The Jihad movement in Iraq on November 9, 1914, when Basra was threatened by the danger of the British invasion. A telegram arrived from the religious scholars in Basra to the scholars of the holy shrines and various Iraqi cities, saying, "**The border of Basra is surrounded by infidels. Everyone**

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the hands of prominent scholars, and he stayed there until he obtained the rank of ijtiḥād, after which he devoted himself to teaching and guidance, then he moved to the city of Ahwaz and assumed religious leadership. There he was without a competitor, and when World War I broke out, he issued a fatwa calling for jihad on the side of the Ottoman Empire, and began urging the Ahwazi tribes and their tribes to revolt. Then he went to Isfahan to urge its tribes to jihad, and after his health deteriorated, he died in Baghdad in 1950, and his body was transferred to the Holy City of Najaf to be buried there. See: Hussein Khalaf Sheikh Khazal, *Political History of Kuwait*, vol. 4, Beirut, 1965, PP. 32-33.

<sup>(32)</sup>Ali Al-Wardi, *Op.Cit.*, Vol. 4, P. 141.

<sup>(33)</sup>Attiya Dakhil Abbas, *The Policy of the Ottoman governors towards the Hilla tribes 1869-1916*, *Journal of Human Sciences / College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Babylon*, Volume (1), Issue (15), 2013, P. 132.

<sup>(34)</sup>Jassim Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Yassari, *The Najaf Uprising 1915, an analytical study*, *Karbala Scientific Journal*, Volume (9), Issue (2), 2011, P. 40.

<sup>(35)</sup> *Ibid.*



**is under arms. We fear for the rest of the country. Islam, help us by ordering the tribes to defend”** <sup>(36)</sup>. The governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, believed that every lost land was a blow to Islam and the homeland, and that all lands located within the borders of the Ottoman state must be a single front for its people to join together to defend it. He began urging the Iraqi people to unite and stand against the British occupation and leave the differences that affect them. Their unity and the preservation of their being<sup>(37)</sup>. The city of Baghdad formed a delegation from Muhammad Pasha al-Daghistani, Shawkat Pasha, Sheikh Hamid al-Kulaidar, and others to head to the city of Najaf. The delegation held an extensive meeting in the al-Hindi Mosque with a number of religious scholars, notables, and tribal leaders <sup>(38)</sup>, and they were addressed by Sayid Muhammad Saeed al-Haboubi <sup>(39)</sup>, Sheikh Abdul Karim al-Hairi, and a number of Among the scholars and tribal leaders, they stated that the Muslim government must participate in repelling the infidels from the lands of Islam <sup>(40)</sup>. The fatwas issued by religious scholars and the people’s outburst were not in response to the call for jihad issued by a large number of these mujtahids who represented the seminary, and as a result most of the scholars from other cities of Iraq responded to the jihad movement out of defense of the Ottoman state , but rather to defend the lands of Islam and for fear of the British controlled the capabilities of Iraq. These fatwas also constituted a surprise to the Ottoman state . They not only issued them, but also announced their initiative to lead the masses of Mujahideen. These fatwas were also considered a surprise to the British <sup>(41)</sup>,The scholars of Najaf Al-Ashraf were the ones who, at this stage in Iraq’s modern history, recorded the most wonderful images of heroism and sacrifice of what they possessed in order to defend the homeland and the holy sites. It was Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Haboubi, who led the first group of mujahideen and was the most enthusiastic of the mujahideen for jihad. He moved on November 15, 1914 from Najaf Al-Ashraf in a majestic procession carrying his sword and the drums beating in front of him through Samawah and Nasiriyah. After arriving in the city of Nasiriyah in mid-January 1915, he began to wander among the tribes of the city urging them to join the jihad movement. A large number of members of the tribes and their leaders responded to this invitation. He also sent He sent a number of his students to distant tribes, calling on them to join the jihad. The Ottoman government was not far from the demonstrations of mobilization that included all regions of Iraq. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey contributed through his field monitoring of the groups of mujahideen who filled the jihad fields with financial aid, in addition to providing food and military equipment <sup>(42)</sup>.

### 3- Changing the Military Leadership:

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<sup>(36)</sup>Karim Ajeel Faleh Al-Musawi, Op.Cit., P. 147.

<sup>(37)</sup> Mehmet Yilmaz, Ümitle Ümitsizlik Arasında Bir Feryat: Süleyman Nazif’in Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndaki Tavri, Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi, Sayı: 37, Yıl 2015, S. 417.

<sup>(38)</sup>Karim Ajeel Faleh Al-Musawi, Op.Cit., P. 148.

<sup>(39)</sup>Muhammad Saeed Al-Haboubi: Muhammad Saeed bin Mahmoud bin Qasim bin Kazem bin Hussein bin Hamza bin Mustafa bin Jamal Al-Din, was born in the holy city of Najaf on February 20, 1849, and belongs to the Al Haboubi family, which is an Arab family of good lineage, and his nickname is (Al-Haboubi). The family was not given this title until after it was given to her grandfather (Mustafa bin Jamal al-Din), who was beloved among the people and his friends and lovers. Therefore, this title prevailed over him. He was a scholar, a hard worker, a great jurist, and a creative poet. He led the masses of Mujahideen after declaring holy jihad after Iraq was subjected to occupation. The Briton and died in the city of Nasiriyah in 1915. See: Ali Farouk Mahmoud Abdullah Al-Haboubi, Muhammad Saeed Al-Haboubi and his intellectual and political role 1849-1915, Master’s thesis, College of Arts, University of Kufa, 2010.

<sup>(40)</sup>Ali Al-Wardi, Op.Cit.,Vol. 4, P. 141.

<sup>(41)</sup>Jassim Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Yasari, Op.Cit.,P.41.

<sup>(42)</sup> Ibid.,P.42.

After the removal of the former governor of Baghdad, Javid Pasha, who assumed military leadership in addition to his administrative attitude, and as a result of the rapid victories achieved by the British forces, which demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman forces and the unwillingness of the Ottoman leadership in Iraq to stand up to the British invasion, the Ottoman state decided to reconsider the organization of its forces in Iraq. They also worked to win and support public opinion influenced by religious sentiments to take up arms against the British, and the military commander Suleiman Askari was appointed, who was entrusted with command of the Sixth Corps and to develop appropriate plans and prepare to confront the British forces. Suleiman Askari arrived in Baghdad in late December 1914 <sup>(43)</sup>, When he arrived in Baghdad, he began addressing the people and the commanders, saying, **“He will defeat the British army and throw it into the sea within a short period of time, thus liberating Qurna and Basra, and reclaiming the coasts of the Arabian Gulf from the English.”** He mentioned that the judge of Basra, who was an agent for the governor, and after the fall of Basra, he returned to Baghdad and was killed in the headquarters of Commander Suleiman Askari by one of his men in the Abdel-Ahad Hotel in Baghdad. He found a paper near his funeral with the words **“This is the punishment for whoever surrenders the country to the enemy”** <sup>(44)</sup> written on it, and with him was the regiment called (**Osmanjak Tabori**). The Ottoman leadership in Istanbul also issued orders to the Thirty-fifth Division to return to Iraq after it had gone to Aleppo for military purposes. With these preparations, the Ottoman leadership was able to strengthen and organize its forces and prepare to confront the British forces<sup>(45)</sup>. Immediately upon assuming the administration of the Baghdad Province, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey sent Letters to the leaders and sheikhs of Arab tribes, an attempt by him to form a military force in support of the Ottoman forces to stand against the British forces, in addition to the numbers of volunteers from Iraqis and tribesmen who fulfilled the fatwa for jihad, and their number reached (10-15) thousand fighters. The clerics did not content themselves with issuing fatwas, but rather intended Battlefields, and some of them assumed command of some military fronts<sup>(46)</sup>. Also, the national responsibility placed on the shoulders of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey stems from his sense of the danger that will face the people of the nation, which represents the danger of losing its existence. The governor stressed, through his concerns and his persistent call, to confront the British occupation, as he believed that the First World War would constitute a turning point in the existence of... Ottoman society and on the historical stage <sup>(47)</sup>.

#### 4- The Battle of Shuaiba:

After the defeat of the Ottoman forces in the battles of Basra and Qurna, they withdrew towards the Shuaiba region, which has an important strategic location, as it controlled the transportation routes towards Nasiriyah and the regions of the Middle Euphrates. The Ottoman government began to reorganize its forces after assigning their leadership to Commander Suleiman Askari <sup>(48)</sup>, and Sayid

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<sup>(43)</sup>Jaafar Abbas Hamidi, Op.Cit.,18.

<sup>(44)</sup>Muhammad Taher Al-Amri Al-Mawsili, History of Iraq’s Political Capabilities, Vol. 1, Baghdad, 1925, P. 102.

<sup>(45)</sup>Shakir Hussein Dumdum , 2023. “Social Conditions of Shatra During British Rule 1918-1921.” Thi Qar Arts Journal 2 (43). Huminites:P.7.

<https://doi.org/10.32792/tqartj.v2i43.477>

<sup>(46)</sup>Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Iraq in the League of Occupation and Mandate, vol. 1, Damascus, 1935, PP. 16-17.

<sup>(47)</sup>Mehmet Yilmaz, Op. Cit., S. 416.

<sup>(48)</sup>Muhammad Asfour Salman, Contemporary History of Iraq 1914-1968, A Study in the Political Aspect, Baghdad, (No date), P. 15.

Mohsen Abu Tabikh, who is One of the masters of the Levant, in his memoirs, described the nature of the great mobilization that the holy jihad fatwa received in all regions, as the sailing ships that were carrying large numbers of mujahideen moved from the regions of the Middle Euphrates on December 21, 1914 towards Samawah on their way to join Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Haboubi. This campaign reached the center of the Al-Muntafiq Brigade, which is the last stage, where the Mujahideen gathered from the tribes, and after the groups of Mujahideen met with Sayid Muhammad Saeed Al-Haboubi <sup>(49)</sup>, and based on the directives of the governor of Nasiriyah, Hamza Bey, who ordered them to wait for the military force that was heading to the Shuaiba area from Command of the Sixth Army in Baghdad, which numbered approximately two thousand soldiers equipped with German weapons, led by Al-Bakbashi Ali Bek Kajal. After arriving in the city of Nasiriyah, these forces stayed for two weeks in the city, and then moved together with the groups of Mujahideen through the Al-Himar Marsh using their sailing ships towards the Shuaiba area. These crowds arrived on January 23, 1915, when they camped in a place called (Al-Nakhila) on the cliff of the marsh between Al-Ghubayshiyah and Al-Shuaiba <sup>(50)</sup>. The crowds of Mujahideen gathered in this area, when I met Ajami Pasha Al-Saadoun and the Mujahideen who were with him from the Basra Brigade and other brigades. These groups stayed for nearly two months while they were waiting for the military commander, Suleiman Askari, who was wounded in the battle of Al-Muzayra'a near Qurna and was sent to Baghdad for the purpose of treatment, but he preferred to join the military units and returned to the fighting fronts despite his injury, and after that he began organizing his military plan, which he divided into three axes: The side axes consisted of the tribes and the core consisted of the regular military force <sup>(51)</sup>, and the British also mobilized their forces against the Ottoman forces <sup>(52)</sup>. This battle gained special importance as a large number of Iraqis from various regions (Arabs and Kurds) participated in it, led by a number of clerics who fulfilled the fatwa for jihad holy city. The heroism of the Mujahideen led by Sayyed Muhammad Saeed Al-Haboubi was also evident in this battle, as more than (15) thousand Mujahideen gathered in the Shuaiba area. At dawn on April 12, 1915, military orders were issued by the Supreme Command after it had completed its preparations. The Ottoman forces and Iraqi fighters attacked the British forces from three axes<sup>(53)</sup>: the right axis was composed of the tribes of the Basra Brigade and a section of the tribes of the Al-Muntafiq Brigade, led by Sheikh Ajami Pasha Al-Saadoun. As for the left axis, it was composed of the rest of the Muntafiq tribes, the middle Euphrates tribes, and the Mujahideen from other cities, led by Sheikh Abdullah Bey Al-Saadoun, while the main axis was led by Suleiman Askari <sup>(54)</sup>. A soldier committed suicide after the defeat of his forces, and this action had a significant impact on the morale of the Ottoman army, which withdrew towards Nasiriyah <sup>(55)</sup>. After the suicide of Suleiman Askari, the commander of the Ottoman forces, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey assumed the responsibility of managing the battle fronts until a military commander was appointed to lead the Ottoman forces. During this short period, he wrote the most wonderful heroic epics by gathering the dispersed forces, organizing them, and preparing them in cooperation with the people of those regions. Governor Suleiman took Nazif struggles to perform his national duty as he witnesses the disasters he is experiencing through the loss of large parts of Basra Province. He also seeks, by employing his literary activity, to create national awareness by unifying ranks against the British forces, which began to continue their advance towards the city of Baghdad

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<sup>(49)</sup>Jamil Mohsen Abu Tabikh, *Memoirs of Mr. Mohsen Abu Tabikh (1910-1960)*, Beirut, 2001, P. 41.

<sup>(50)</sup> Ibid.,P.41.

<sup>(51)</sup> Ibid.,P.43.

<sup>(52)</sup>Muhammad Asfour Salman , *Op. Cit.*,P.15.

<sup>(53)</sup>Enas Saadi Abdullah, *Op. Cit.*,P.595.

<sup>(54)</sup>Jamil Mohsen Abu Tabikh, *Op. Cit.*,P.43.

<sup>(55)</sup>Enas Saadi Abdullah, *Op. Cit.*,P.595.

after... He achieved major victories over the Ottoman forces and the Mujahideen in the Battle of Shuaiba<sup>(56)</sup>.

The Battle of Shuaiba constituted a decisive stage in the modern history of Iraq, as a result of the negative effects that this battle had on the high Ottoman leadership, as it destroyed the morale of the Ottoman army, especially after the suicide of its commander, Suleiman Askari. It also demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman forces and their inability to withstand the British forces. It was a battle Shuaiba caused the disappointment of most Iraqi tribes, in addition to the lack of trust between the two allied parties, and this was reflected in the weakening of the role of the resistance. It was also considered one of the decisive battles in the history of the British occupation, which then continued its advance towards Amara and Nasiriyah after the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces<sup>(57)</sup>. The governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, began to recall the historical roots that the city of Baghdad had enjoyed for many centuries. Moreover, the governor saw through that field mobilization that the holy jihad fatwa represented the real solution to rid Iraq of the British occupation <sup>(58)</sup>.

#### **Reasons for the defeat of the Ottoman forces and the Mujahideen in the Battle of Shuaiba:**

Multiple reasons contributed to the negative results that resulted from the Battle of Shuaiba, the most prominent of which are <sup>(59)</sup>:

A- The military equipment and ammunition used by the Ottoman army constituted a direct cause of defeat, as all the weapons used were old-fashioned compared to the modern weapons used by the British army.

B - The Ottoman army had to fight on several fronts, and this is what the Ottoman state suffered greatly from in terms of the difficulties it was facing, not on its front in Iraq, but on other fronts. Also, the shortage of soldiers in the war constituted a problem on the Iraqi front, and as a result of this shortage, which it caused armed movements by the people of Najaf and Karbala against the Ottomans.

C - Since August 1914, the Ottoman state declared a general mobilization, which is what is called in the Turkish language (Sefer Berlek), and it was very harsh on the population of the Ottoman state after the declaration of World War I, under the pretext of maintaining its neutrality towards those who wanted to attack it, and it recruited large numbers. Of young men between the ages of twenty and forty-five, the Iraqi people were among the peoples who most hated compulsory conscription, and this is what caused many uprisings due to the escape of large numbers of them.

D- The Ottoman officers' mistreatment of the Mujahideen is another factor in increasing the rift between the two parties, as the Ottoman officers viewed the Arabs with a racist, fanatical superiority and accused them of treason and collaborators.

E- The Ottoman mismanagement, their failure to develop appropriate military plans, their weak self-confidence, and their failure to supply the Mujahideen armies with equipment and food, in addition to provoking them on many occasions.

#### **5- The Efforts of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey after the Battle of Shuaiba:**

Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey sent an encrypted telegram to the inspectors of the Interior on April 17, 1915, after the defeat of the Ottoman forces in the Battle of Shuaiba, in which he warned not to

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<sup>(56)</sup>Mehmet Yilmaz, Op. Cit., S. 418.

<sup>(57)</sup>Enas Saadi Abdullah, Op. Cit.,P.588.

<sup>(58)</sup>Mehmet Yilmaz, Op. Cit., S. 419.

<sup>(59)</sup>Emir Bostanci, Kerbela Ve Necef Ğsyanlari (1915-1916), Yüksek Lġsans Tezġ, Sosyal Bġlgmler Enstġtüsü, Ğstanbul Űngversġtesġ ,2019, S.23; Abdul Sattar Shaneen Al-Janabi, The Political History of Najaf 1921-1941, Baghdad, 2010, PP. 34-36.

leave the rural areas, districts and districts unattended, especially after the advance of the British forces towards Baghdad. He also made it clear that the advance towards Basra .The Ottoman forces began to disperse, and they had to maintain the security and safety of the districts, districts, and tribes for fear of being exploited by the British forces. The Ottoman state also had friendly relations with Ajami al-Saadoun, the leader of the Muntafiq, and this in turn would contribute to reorganizing and reorganizing the military forces in the districts and districts and winning over the Arab tribes. He added in His telegram stated that Britain wanted to win these tribes to its side. The Interior Supervisors also took the initiative to submit this telegram to the War Supervisors in order to review the information sent by the Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey <sup>(60)</sup>. The Governor also sent another encrypted telegram to the Interior Supervisors on April 27, 1915, in which he explained The seriousness of the situation in the Basra Province, and he requested the necessity of appointing an agent for the Basra Province until a military commander arrives at the Iraq front and takes over the administration in the Basra Province. In turn, the Interior Ministers sent the telegram to the Grand Vizier in order to take the necessary measures <sup>(61)</sup>.

Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey did not abandon his national responsibilities in order to defend the homeland and the lands of the Ottoman state . As a result, he sent an encrypted document to the Interior Ministry. After matters became complicated and British forces began marching towards Baghdad in two directions, he decided to take the necessary measures through cooperation with the tribes. Arabic, especially after the fatwa of jihad by the mujtahids, and we will fight the British forces. The governor also worked to reorganize and prepare the recruits for war and provided them with their supplies <sup>(62)</sup>.The Directorate of Protocol in the Sublime Porte also sent a telegram to the Interior Directorate on May 9, 1915, in which it explained that the Sultan Al-Othmani issued a Sunni will granting the Governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Nazif Bey, the Governor of Konya Azmi, the Governor of Ankara Muzaffar, the Governor of Adana Haqqi, the Governor of Maamoura Al-Aziz Thabet, and the Governor of Aleppo Jalal Bey the Golden Sapphire Medal and the Medal of Excellence. It also included honoring a number of governors of the provinces with the gold medal, for their efforts in providing the needs of the Ottoman armies in the states mentioned above<sup>(63)</sup>.

#### **6- The Attitude of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey regarding the uprising of Najaf in 1915:**

The Holy Najaf Uprising broke out on May 12, 1915, and it is considered one of the most important uprisings in which they declared that they would not submit to the authority of the state. It lasted three days of fighting and resulted in the departure of the Ottoman forces from the city, and its local administration was entrusted to the leadership of the leaders of the four localities. Before these events, it was the Holy Najaf. It enjoys specificity in terms of its importance and religious status, and as a result, its children were exempted from performing military service, and it was given the authority to manage its local affairs <sup>(64)</sup>. After the defeat of the Ottoman forces and Iraqi volunteers, the number of deserting soldiers increased, and most of them headed to the holy city of Najaf, due to its special description. After the influence of the deserters increased, one day they distributed a leaflet in which it was written that fighting the Ottoman government was better than fighting the

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<sup>(60)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 468-3 /1, Tarih : 5 Nisan 1331 R ( 17 April 1915).

<sup>(61)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 468- 174 /1, Tarih : 15 Nisan 1331 R (27 April 1915).

<sup>(62)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 469- 106/1, Tarih : 21 Nisan 1331 R (3 May 1915).

<sup>(63)</sup>BOA, DH.KMS., Nr. 32- 70/2, Tarih : 24 Cemaziyelâhir 1333 ( 8 May 1915).

<sup>(64)</sup>Ikhlas Laftah Hariz Al-Kaabi, The attitude of the Seminary in Najaf Al-Ashraf on the Political Developments in Iraq 1914-1924, Master's thesis, College of Education, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2006, P. 62.

polytheists, and this was announced. The groups expressed their attitudes rejecting the occupation, whether it was Ottoman or British <sup>(65)</sup>.

The Ottoman government tried to return them to the battle fronts, and before this incident, the Ottoman government had imposed compulsory conscription on the Iraqi people at the outbreak of World War I. After the escape of this large number of soldiers, the Ottoman government threatened to implement compulsory conscription on the people of Najaf, and in return it imposed sums of money. High cash allowance (military service allowance) <sup>(66)</sup>.

There were several reasons for the uprising in Najaf, including the Ottomans' mistreatment of the Mujahideen during the period of preparations for the Battle of Shuaiba, which caused an increase in the rift between the two parties. The Ottomans also viewed the Arabs with a fanatical, racist view, in addition to accusing them of treason even before the outbreak of the Battle of Shuaiba. Events: The Ottoman government sent a military force to the holy city of Najaf, led by Officer Izzat Ahmed. After its arrival, it gave a three-day warning for the fugitives to surrender themselves. After the warning period expired, the Ottoman forces attacked the city and searched for the fugitives, which led to a number of women being subjected to harassment as a result of that. Actions under the pretext that the fugitives were disguised as women <sup>(67)</sup>. These events developed after a member of the Ottoman forces opened fire on one of the minarets of the Noble Alawite Mosque, causing excitement and anger among the clerics in particular and the people of Najaf in general <sup>(68)</sup>. As a result of these events, Sayid Muhammad Kadhim Al-Yazdi sent a protest telegram to the higher authorities in Istanbul <sup>(69)</sup>, and the seminary announced its attitude in support of the Ottoman state and resistance to the British occupation. In these events, it announced its mediation in restoring the Ottoman authority in its symbolic form to the city of Najaf, and this attitude can be considered support. to the Ottomans, in addition to renewing its call for jihad <sup>(70)</sup>.

After the deterioration of the security situation in most Iraqi cities, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey sent an encrypted telegram to the interior ministers, which included some necessary recommendations that must be followed after the escape of large numbers of soldiers from the battles, as well as the tribal uprisings in Najaf and Karbala, and after the warnings that the governor warned about in his telegrams. The precedent after the Shuaiba incident was that the military forces were not organized and there was no coordination between the administration and the military leadership. For this reason, there were large groups of army personnel fleeing from the fronts and the tribes announcing their uprisings and threatening the Ottoman administration. As a result, these conditions led to a state of instability<sup>(71)</sup>.

### **7- The Attitude of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey Regarding the Karbala Uprising in 1915 Against the Ottoman Authority:**

The Karbala incident took place on Shaban 15, 1333 AH (June 27, 1915 AD), that is, on the night of the middle of Shaban, which was the night of the birth of Imam Mahdi (may God bless him and grant him peace). After the gathering of large numbers of crowds of visitors, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, the governor of Baghdad, did not abandon his national responsibilities in Confronting the armed

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<sup>(65)</sup>Ali Abd al-Muttalib Hamoud Ali Khan al-Madani, Social Life in the City of Najaf (1914-1932), Master's Thesis, College of Arts, University of Kufa, 2004, P. 22.

<sup>(66)</sup>Karim Ajeel Faleh Al-Musawi, Op.Cit., P. 153.

<sup>(67)</sup>Alaa Aziz Karim, The Attitude of the Seminary in Najaf Al-Ashraf on Political Developments in Iraq 1921-1924, Master's Thesis, College of Education, University of Babylon, 2007, P. 43.

<sup>(68)</sup>Ikhlas by Hariz Al-Kaabi, Op.Cit., P.62.

<sup>(69)</sup>Alaa Aziz Karim, , Op.Cit., P.43.

<sup>(70)</sup>Ikhlas by Hariz Al-Kaabi, Op.Cit., P.63.

<sup>(71)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 477-93 / 1, Tarih : 15 Haziran 1331R (27 June 1915).

movements that broke out in several cities, including the city of Karbala, which formed an anti-Ottoman movement through their disobedience against the government, as they attacked government offices in Karbala and burned them, as were large numbers of people fleeing the battle fronts after the failure of the jihad movement and the defeat of the Ottoman forces in battle. Shuaiba played a major role in this uprising, and it was also a result of what happened in the holy city of Najaf, and Sheikh Muhammad Ali Kammouna and his brother Fakhri were the ones who led this movement<sup>(72)</sup>. The Banu Hasan tribe also attacked the city of Karbala. This incident was mentioned (Bill) after it was reported on the events of Najaf in April 1915. It stated the following: **“One month later, June 1915, open strife and strife began in Karbala, and it appears that its origin was an attack launched on the town by a tribe. The neighboring Bani Hassan, which had an old enmity with the residents of Karbala, did not do anything by the Ottoman government to calm it based on the policy of (divide and rule) that was manifesting itself. On this occasion, the government did not gain anything from the quarrels. It may have consulted them itself, because Bani Hassan was burned. The palace was looted and looted. Then the mob rose and expelled the government, and the sheikhs of the country, headed by the Commune, took over the management of its affairs”**<sup>(73)</sup>.

Despite the fact that the governor of Karbala, Suleiman Dhakhi, informed the commander of the Iraq Front forces of action to suppress those uprisings, and as a result of the rapid developments that occurred in most Iraqi cities, including the city of Karbala, the Ottoman authorities took precautionary measures for fear of a general uprising against them while they were in a state of war, the governor wrote. Suleiman Nazif Bey, Governor of Baghdad, sent a telegram to the interior ministers that included a number of commandments that must be followed during this period, including the need to accelerate the deployment of government forces in Karbala and its outskirts, find out the real reasons behind these opposition movements, and reorganize the Ottoman forces in the areas of Karbala and its outskirts in Najaf, as he warned. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey said in his telegram that these events will be exploited by the British and used as an excuse for progress, and that there is a serious threat that will face Iraq during this period if the necessary measures are not taken<sup>(74)</sup>. The events of Karbala posed a great challenge to the Ottoman authorities and this is what was observed. Through the many correspondences between the governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, and the governor of Karbala, Suleiman Azhi, which caused a state of instability in the general situation in the city, and the small number of Ottoman soldiers in the city, the discontent that the population was experiencing, and the large number of people fleeing from the battles of Shuaiba, Nasiriyah, and Al-Amara caused this uprising to occur, However, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey stressed the necessity of returning security and stability to the city of Karbala and that the force sent by the Ottoman state was not for the purpose of imposing security and stability within the city only, but rather to show the people that the power of the Ottoman state is still present and strong<sup>(75)</sup>.

The governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, granted broad powers to the commander of the Gendarmerie, Kamel Effendi Al-Suri, who was at the rank of the Qamandani column. After his arrival in the city of Karbala, he stayed at the house of his friend Hajj Khalil Al-Istarabadi and took several measures, including meeting with the presidents and leaders of Karbala and issuing an amnesty to those who deserted the army on the condition that they be a reserve for the Gendarmerie in Karbala, so he responded. He has many of them. He also met with the imprisoned sheikhs of Karbala, Al-Furat, Al-Awsat, and Najaf and promised to visit their families. He also assigned Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Al-

(72) Ban Rawi Shaltagh Al-Hamidawi, *The Attitude of Karbala Scholars on the British Occupation of Iraq 1914-1921*, Karbala Heritage Magazine, Volume Three, Issue Three, September 2016, P. 31.

(73) Quoted in: Abdul-Sahib Nasser Al Nasrallah, *History of Karbala*, Vol. 5, Beirut, 2018, P. 98.

(74) BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 477-93 / 1, Tarih : 15 Haziran 1331R (27 June 1915).

(75) Emir Bostanci, *Op. Cit.*, S 23.

Masoud, one of the sheikhs of the Al-Masoud tribe, to secure the Karbala-Al-Musayyib road. In addition, he promised to reduce taxes on the people and hold bribed officials accountable <sup>(76)</sup>.

Despite the extensive measures taken by the government, it was not able to impose its control over the city of Karbala and restore security and stability, except after mediation and reconciliation carried out by the scholars of Karbala between the government and the Al-Kamuna family. As a result, the government appointed Hamza Bey as the new administrator of the city of Karbala, and the city was also exposed. Karbala during this period due to malaria and its spread in most of its regions, which helped to complete reconciliation <sup>(77)</sup>, and Britain was not far from the events in the city of Karbala by sending a spy called (Edkar Wood), who worked with his aides to stir up strife in the city, and this is what he warned against. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, in his telegram that he sent to the Interior Minister, warned Britain of exploiting these situations to its advantage <sup>(78)</sup>.

### **8- Hilla Uprising in 1915:**

In 1915, the Ottoman government instructed Nur al-Din Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman forces in Iraq, to move peacefully against the Hilla tribes to collect the accumulated taxes from the previous years (1909-1914) in order to sustain the war effort. The military commander met with the leaders of the Hilla tribes and informed them of the Istanbul government's directives in Urging the members of the tribes to support the state as it engages in war and to express full cooperation in responding to its request to pay the amounts of their taxes, Nur al-Din Pasha succeeded in his mission after those tribes announced their agreement to pay their financial dues to the Ottoman government <sup>(79)</sup>.

However, the security situation quickly deteriorated in the city of Hilla, as a result of what happened in the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and some other Iraqi cities, as they were waiting for the appropriate opportunity to pounce against the local Ottoman authorities, and that was shortly after the outbreak of World War I. The city of Hilla was one of the Iraqi cities that... It witnessed a major uprising similar to what happened in Najaf and Karbala, in which these cities began to govern themselves under independent local administration. This encouraged the people of Hilla to carry out an uprising against the local authorities, taking advantage of the Ottomans' preoccupation with fighting the British, which forced them to withdraw their military garrisons in the areas of the Middle Euphrates. Which resulted in a large security vacuum in those areas, as well as large numbers of soldiers fleeing the battle fronts who began causing problems, and as a result the Ottoman forces used various methods of abuse and violence against them <sup>(80)</sup>.

There were many opinions mentioned by researchers about the Hilla Uprising, including that the Hilla tribes refused to pay the taxes accumulated on them for the previous years (1909-1914), which angered the Ottoman authority, and also that one of the elements fleeing the battle fronts killed a member of the local gendarme when it was pursuing them and after it failed. By arresting the killer, it used provocative methods through which it mistreated the residents of the city of Hilla until the matter developed into an exchange of fire between the residents and the military garrison <sup>(81)</sup>.

### **9- The Nature of the Differences Between the Governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Nazif Bey, and the Army Leaders:**

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<sup>(76)</sup>Abdul-Sahib Nasser Al Nasrallah, Op. Cit., P.103.

<sup>(77)</sup>Ban Rawi Shaltagh Al-Hamidawi, Op. Cit., P.32.

<sup>(78)</sup>Ibid.

<sup>(79)</sup>Ali Hadi Abbas Al-Mahdawi, Political Conditions in Hilla, June 1800 - June 1920, Journal of the College of Education Safi al-Din al-Hilli, University of Babylon, Volume One, Issue One, 2009, P. 167.

<sup>(80)</sup>Ibid., P.169.

<sup>(81)</sup>Ibid., P.170.



Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey entered into a long dispute with a number of leaders of the Ottoman army during his term in Baghdad, and the governor's work was limited to managing administrative affairs, according to what was stated in the decree of his appointment. As was known about Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, he had a patriotic tendency and was defending the state's entity with his pen. Through his literary activity, through which he criticized a number of officials of the Ottoman government, and during his term in charge of Baghdad, he saw large parts of the Ottoman state exposed to attacks by the Allied powers after the Ottoman state entered the war on the side of Germany, and during this stage it was engaged in bitter fighting in several fronts, including the Iraq Front, which began to control large parts of the Basra Province. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey stated that at this stage he could not do anything<sup>(82)</sup>. He submitted his resignation in February of 1915 while awaiting the response. He was constantly demanding to stay away from Baghdad and was demanding transfer. To the state of Basra on the one hand, and on the other hand he was complaining about a number of government employees<sup>(83)</sup>.

The Interior Council worked to alleviate the tension that Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey was suffering from, and as a result, on May 21, 1915, this council dismissed the Deputy Governor of Baghdad, Ahmed Bey, due to his dispute with Suleiman Nazif Bey<sup>(84)</sup>.

We would like to point out here that a telegram arrived by mistake from the Commander of the Third Army, Hafez Ismail Hakki Pasha, dated January 14, 1915<sup>(85)</sup> to the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Aleppo, Sivas, Mosul, Ankara, Konya, and Trabzon, and somehow it arrived by mistake in the province of Baghdad, including: The document contains instructions that, according to Mustafa Fırat Gül, stated<sup>(86)</sup>:

A- Starting from the announcement of mobilization, all civilian employees, such as army officers, are obligated to implement all orders issued by the military institution without any conditions.

B- From the moment of notification of this order, any civilian employee, regardless of his rank, who hesitates at all to implement those orders issued by me or the field inspectorate, will be immediately dismissed and transferred to the military court.

It is noted that the second paragraph, which was harsh in its expressions, and that those concerned with the matter in the first place were the governors (provincial governors) and the governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Nazif Bey, were among those who were threatened with dismissal and even referral to the military court. The truth is that this telegram was sent to Baghdad by mistake. Which

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(82) Mustafa Fırat Gül, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Sicağında Hafız Hakki Paşa-Süleyman Nazif Tartışması*, *Asbider Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Cilt(8), Number(24), 2021, S. 482.

(83) BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 468- 174/1, Tarih 15 Nisan 1331 R (27 April 1915).

(84) Mustafa Fırat Gül, *Op. Cit.*, S. 482.

(85) Hafez Ismail Hakki: He is one of the prominent figures in the Society of Union and Progress. He was born in the city of Monastir in 1879. In 1902, he completed the Military Academy and began his service with the rank of Staff Captain. He was appointed first in Bitola and then in Thessaloniki. He entered into conflicts with the Bulgarian gangs. He rose to the rank of Staff Captain. Several military attitudes, in 1904 he became (Chief of Volunteers). In 1908, he became a major. When the incident broke out on April 13, 1909, he was working as a military attaché in Vienna. He left his attitude and joined the Thessaloniki army, which headed towards the capital, Istanbul. After the events were suppressed, he returned to his work in Vienna. In 1910, he married the granddaughter of Sultan Murad V. After that, he was promoted to several senior attitudes in the military corps, and after Enver Pasha was assigned the duties of military supervisor, Hafez Ismail Hakki Pasha assumed command of the Third Corps. See: Mustafa Fırat Gül, *Op. Cit.*, S. 479.

(86) *Ibid.*, P. 483.

caused a long conflict between two prominent figures from the leaders of the Union and Progress in the midst of the events and difficult circumstances that the Ottoman state was going through. After that telegram reached the Baghdad Province, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey responded to the content of what was stated in it, and as it is known that the Baghdad Province is outside the scope of the leadership. The Third Army, as well as the governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, who was not assigned to lead the army at this stage. As a result, the governor described it as (disrespectful) and his response came as follows: **“I read your telegram with astonishment among the civilian employees in the Baghdad Province who are assigned to work in the Interior Ministry in terms of... The official duty and the general command of Iraq in terms of the geographical area of the military command (Sixth Corps), and we are not obligated to accept orders from you or from the field inspectorate. When I act in accordance with the requirements of official duties and inspired by national duties, I think of the inspiration of my conscience, and not of the approval and appreciation of the army commander . So-and-so or such-and-such field inspector”**<sup>(87)</sup>.

Anwar Pasha, the superintendent of war, intervened in the case of the governor Suleiman Nazif Bey and considered that Suleiman Nazif's response was harsh, and demanded that the governor Suleiman Nazif Bey be punished <sup>(88)</sup>. The Interior Supervisor sent a telegram to the governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Nazif Bey, on January 25, 1915, stating that the telegram that had reached The governorship of Baghdad, which was sent by the commander of the Third Army, Hafez Ismail Haqqi, was an oversight, as harsh and hurtful words were directed at Hafez Haqqi Pasha, and he had no precedents for that reprimand to be directed against him. In this regard, and from that time on, Hafez Haqqi Pasha's mind was broken, and that speech was of no consequence. It had a bad effect on his psyche, and for that reason, I removed that effect from him, and I asked him (Suleiman Nazif Bey) to send a message to Hafez Ismail Hakki Pasha to comfort him <sup>(89)</sup>, and accordingly, the governor sent Suleiman Nazif Bey to the Interior Supervisors on January 31, 1915. Based on the request of the Interior Ministry's officers to apologize to the Commander of the Third Army, Hafez Ismail Haqqi, Suleiman Nazif Bey responded **“I am certain that this is a personal and despicable attack on the part of Hafez Ismail Haqqi Pasha, and I believe that he must be forgiven and pardoned, as he underestimated my position”**, and asked The higher authorities cancel that order issued by (Hafiz Ismail Hakki Pasha)<sup>(90)</sup>.

As for his dispute with Nur al-Din Pasha, the governor of Basra and the commander of the forces of the Iraq Front and its outskirts, who arrived in Baghdad on May 19, 1915, it had a great impact on the governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, and the two sides entered into a long conflict, and the two parties complained against each other to the authorities of the Sublime Porte. Nour al-Din Pasha at the end of May 1915, he sent a telegram to the interior ministers in which he explained, **“that the measures taken by Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey were not good and that caused an incident of disobedience and rebellion in Najaf and Karbala by releasing some of the miscreants who caused this rebellion,”** as Nour mentioned. Al-Din Pasha said that the governor, Suleiman Nazif, did not succeed in managing the general situation in the state of Baghdad, and he added that the time was not appropriate during this period to appoint the deputy governor of Baghdad, Ahmed Bey, in his place, since he did not have experience and had problems with the governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey, who was in conflict with a group of soldiers and officers, Commander Nour al-Din Pasha stressed at the conclusion of his telegram the necessity of taking the necessary measures for the Ottoman authorities to the Sublime Porte <sup>(91)</sup>.

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<sup>(87)</sup>Ibid., P. 484.

<sup>(88)</sup>Ibid., P. 485.

<sup>(89)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr.49- 140/1, Tarih : 10 Rebîulevvel 1333 (25 January 1915).

<sup>(90)</sup>BOA, DH. I. UM. EK., Nr. 6-26 /4, Tarih : 16 Rebîulevvel 1333 ( 31 January 1915).

<sup>(91)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 473- 7/1 Tarih : 17 Mayıs 1331 R (29 May 1915).

In early June 1915, Nour al-Din Pasha and Manshar Bey Effendi, Director of the General Security, sent a telegram to the Sublime Porte (code pen of the Interior Supervisors), stating that it was not possible to maintain the appointment of Suleiman Nazif Bey as governor of Baghdad, as the armed movements that took place in Najaf and Karbala due to the lack of understanding in the administration on the part of the governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, and large parts of the state of Baghdad are entering into turmoil and confusion. In addition, the official departments do not carry out their duties and open their doors for two hours in the morning and three hours at the end of the work day, and this period The short period of time, given the importance of government departments in the Baghdad State, is not sufficient. Care must be taken to protect the interests of the population and meet their needs. It is assumed that a new site for the administration should be secured, in addition to their demand to appoint an assistant to the governor who has experience in administrative and civil affairs, because placing the affairs of the state temporarily in the hands of his assistant is not possible <sup>(92)</sup>.

On June 22, the Interior Ministry issued a report on the reality of the Baghdad Province, according to the reports it received about the deterioration of the general situation there. After investigation and scrutiny, the Interior Ministry announced its demand for the appointment of Nour al-Din Pasha to the attitude of governor of Baghdad, while retaining the attitude of Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman military forces on the Iraq front, and the dismissal of Suleiman Nazif Bey from his attitude, and this list was submitted to the Council of Ministers and the Ottoman Sultan for approval and a session was held regarding it <sup>(93)</sup>, and upon the request of the Interior Supervisors, the Great Council of Supremacy held its meeting and announced its approval of the appointment of Brigadier General Nour al-Din Pasha as governor of Baghdad and the dismissal of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey. The Council also submitted this decision to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed Rashad V, who announced his approval of the decision of the Grand Council regarding the appointment of Nour al-Din Pasha as governor of Baghdad and commander-in-chief of the military forces in Iraq. Then a Sunni will was issued in which he announced the appointment of Nour al-Din Pasha and the dismissal of the governor, Suleiman Nazif Bey. A telegram was sent from the Registry of Important Affairs in the Great Authority to the Interior Directorate announcing the approval of her request <sup>(94)</sup>.

In turn, the Interior Ministry (Directorate of Personnel and Civil Registration) sent a telegram to the governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Nazif Bey, on June 28, 1915, stating that bringing together the civil and military administration of Iraq and the state of Baghdad under the leadership of one person would have great civil and military benefits during this stage. The telegram stated: Nour al-Din Pasha, governor of Basra, was appointed governor of Baghdad and military commander of the army<sup>(95)</sup>. On June 29, 1915, the Sunni will was issued, bearing the signatures of the Ottoman Sultan and members of the Council of Ministers, including the Grand Vizier, the Foreign Minister, the Sheikh of Islam, and the Navy, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior Directors. The Sunni will included the dismissal of the governor of Baghdad Province, Suleiman Nazif Bey, and the appointment of the commander of the Iraq Front forces in his place. And its parties and the governor of Basra, Commander Mir Allai (Brigadier General) Nour al-Din, according to the decision of the Council of Ministers, and notification was made to the Military and Interior Departments in order to take the necessary measures and notify the decision to the authorities in the Baghdad Province <sup>(96)</sup>.

The problems that Suleiman Nazif Bey faced with the soldiers and army leaders and their dominance over state affairs during the period of World War I were many, and because of these circumstances

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<sup>(92)</sup>BOA, DH. KMS., Nr. 32-51/3, Tarih : 24 Receb 1333 ( 6 June 1915).

<sup>(93)</sup>BOA, MV., Nr. 241-6/1, Tarih : 10 Şaban 1333 ( 22 June 1915).

<sup>(94)</sup>BOA, BEO., Nr. 4362- 327084/1 . Tarih : 16 1333 ( 28 June 1915).

<sup>(95)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr. 54- 213/1, Tarih : 15 Şaban 1333 (27 June 1915).

<sup>(96)</sup>BOA, I. MMS., Nr. 197- 6/3 , Tarih : 16 Şaban 1333 ( 28 June 1915).

and the overlap of powers between the administration and the military leadership, the negative effects of which were reflected in the failure to carry out the administrative tasks assigned to him, and the events of the war that accelerated its pace occurred after the Battle of Shuaiba and the defeat of the Ottoman forces and the masses of Iraqi Mujahideen volunteers on April 14, 1915, and the deterioration of the general conditions in the Baghdad Province, which led to his removal<sup>(97)</sup>. On June 30, 1915, Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey sent the documents to the Interior Supervisor, requesting that his accumulated salaries be sent for a month and a half. In turn, notification was sent to the Finance Supervisor in Dar Al-Saada in order to take the necessary measures to disburse the salaries of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey<sup>(98)</sup>.

### **10- Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey left Baghdad Province:**

Suleiman Nazif Bey was one of the distinguished writers, famous writers, and people of superior management and political skill. He was considered one of the moderate figures and was distinguished by his high patriotism and his keenness to bring together the diaspora of the Ottoman state. He declared his attitudes in support of the Ottoman League and Islamic unity. He was a critic of nationalist racism and strongly rejected it in all his literary attitudes. And politically, he called through his attitudes not to neglect the unity of the Ottoman state, and strongly criticized the policy of the federalist government after it was able to extend its control over the reins of power to implement the policy of Turkification. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey also feared the emergence of racist and nationalist movements seeking to separate from the state entity. Ottomanism was the opposite result of what was practiced by the federal government.

During his tenure in Baghdad, we did not see him going against the wishes of the people, but benefiting from him was little due to the state of war and the poor conditions resulting from it. He was not negligent in performing his administrative duties, and his term in Baghdad was one of the most difficult stages in his political life because it came at a difficult time<sup>(99)</sup>. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey is considered one of the literary figures who declared his love for Iraq through his cultural works that he later wrote. Then the governor left the city of Baghdad on Wednesday, corresponding to Shaban 24, 1333 AH (July 6, 1915 AD), in a majestic procession in a place called (Al-Masoudi). He was bid farewell by the Deputy Governor, Commander Yusuf Zia Bey, Lieutenant General Muhammad Fadil Pasha of Daghistani, and a large number of nobles, notables and notables of the city of Baghdad, heading to Istanbul, as the governorship of Baghdad was his last political and administrative mission<sup>(100)</sup>.

### **Conclusion:**

One of the most important results that we reached through this research, which focused on the policy pursued by the Ottoman government during the reign of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, can be summarized as follows:

1. The reason for these defeats suffered by the Ottoman forces is due to this weakness of the state on the one hand, and on the other hand its concern for its economic and financial interests. Because of its arbitrary policy, it made the people complain about it and try to get rid of it by every means. The most prominent evidence occurred during the mandate of Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey of Baghdad Province, and although he made great reform efforts, he did not achieve them.

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<sup>(97)</sup>Jamil Musa Al-Najjar, Op.Cit.,P.181.

<sup>(98)</sup>BOA, DH. ŞFR., Nr.478-34/1, Tarih : 18 Haziran 1331R (30 June 1915).

<sup>(99)</sup>Abbas Al-Azzawi, Op.Cit., Vol. 8, P. 324.

<sup>(100)</sup> Ibid., P.329.

2. Suleiman Nazif Bey was a moderate figure and was distinguished by his high patriotism and his keenness to bring together the diaspora of the Ottoman state . He announced his attitudes in support of the Ottoman League and Islamic unity.

3. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey, through his attitudes, called for not compromising the unity of the Ottoman state , and strongly criticized the policy of the federalist government after it was able to extend its control over the reins of power and implement the policy of Turkification.

4. The overlap of powers between Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey and the army commanders caused a state of instability in the general administrative situation in Baghdad Province.

5. His term in Baghdad witnessed internal conditions, instability, disobedience, and uprisings in a number of cities, including Najaf, Karbala, and Hilla, against the authority of the Ottoman state .

6. His term in Baghdad was one of the most difficult stages in his political life because it came at a difficult time. Governor Suleiman Nazif Bey is also considered one of the literary figures who declared his love for Iraq through his cultural works that he wrote later.

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